The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court 1873-1903 by Kay, Richard S.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 29 Number 4 Article 9 
10-1-1980 
The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court 1873-1903 
Richard S. Kay 
University of Connecticut School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, 
Jurisprudence Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard S. Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court 1873-1903, 29 Buff. L. Rev. 667 (1980). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol29/iss4/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE IN THE SUPREME COURT
1873 - 1903*
RICHARD S. KAY**
"No searching analysis is necessary to eliminate its meaning.
Its language is intelligible and direct. Nothing can be more
transparent. Every word employed has an established signifi-
cation. There is no room for construction. There is nothing to
construe. Elaboration may obscure but it cannot make
clearer the intent and purpose to be carried out."t
INTRODUCTION
This essay is a review of the adjudication in the Supreme
Court of the United States of claims that a state had denied the
equal protection of the laws, guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment, and thus violated one of the constitutional limits on its
power. It will focus on the first thirty years of such decisions. More
specifically it will examine the process by which the Court decided
for itself and for the country, what concrete kinds of legal inequal-
ity were forbidden by the constitutional prohibition.,
The history of equal protection adjudication in the Supreme
Court has been subjected to stark oversimplification. The conven-
tional view is that there have been two phases in the Court's appli-
cation of the clause. The first, "traditional," period applied a leni-
* 0 1981 by Richard S. Kay
** Professor of Law, Univeristy of Connecticut School of Law. I am grateful for the
useful suggestions for revision and improvement of earlier drafts of this article made by
Loftus Becker, Hugh Macgill, Thomas Morawetz, Kent Newmyer, John Noyes, Aviam
Soifer, James Stark and Carol Weisbrod. I was fortunate to have the intelligent and careful
research assistance of Anne Robillard Hoyt. Early stages of this research were assisted by a
University of Connecticut Faculty Summer Fellowship.
t The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 126 (1873) (Swayne, J., dissenting).
1. Thus this study will focus on this single question out of the welter of equal protec-
tion interpretation issues which have presented themselves to judges and commentators. It
will not dwell on such questions as what are "person[s] within [the] jurisdiction" of a state.
Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 260-61 (1898). Nor will it explore the question of when an
inequality is the result of state action and therefore proscribed. The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883). The extent to which the equal protection clause prohibits plainly public dis-
crimination presents difficulties enough.
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ent standard of review to uphold legislation (other than that
involving racial discrimination) challenged as in conflict with the
constitutional requirement. The second, "new" or "two-tier" equal
protection period commenced in the 1960's and involved applica-
tion of a strict standard of review for certain disfavored legislative
classifications, while maintaining a deferential approach toward so-
cial and economic regulation.'
But even the very beginnings of equal protection adjudication
showed far more change and complexity than this model accommo-
dates. Active review of legislative classifications was well estab-
lished by the end of the period under study. Furthermore, and
contrary to commonly held assumptions, this era can best be un-
derstood not as one of mechanical formalism but of adjudication
without standards or boundaries.8 The failure to recognize these
complications is attributable in large part to the relative neglect of
the cases decided prior to the 1930's. General notice of equal pro-
tection decisions of the nineteenth century has been confined to a
handful of "landmark" cases such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins4 decided
in 1886 and Plessy v. Ferguson5 decided in 1896, the citations of
which have become shorthand symbols for particular, discrete doc-
trines of constitutional law. Even with respect to these decisions,
however, the failure to understand the developing context in which
they were rendered has led to substantial misinterpretations."
This period has, quite correctly, been studied with an empha-
sis on the Supreme Court's increasing tendency to find legislation
invalid when measured against the demands imposed by the Court
under the authority of the due process clause of the amendment.
In fact, the equal protection decisions roughly tracked these due
process developments. Indeed, in a number of cases, the equal pro-
tection issues were resolved in conclusory addenda to the Court's
2. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978)(opinion
of Powell, J.); id. at 356-59 (opinion of Brennan, J.); G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 657-65 (9th ed. 1975); Simson, A Method for Analyzing Discrimina-
tory Effects Under the Equal Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REv. 663, 663-65 (1977); Wil-
kinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Consti-
tutional Equality, 61 VA. L. Rav. 945, 947 (1975).
3. See text accompanying notes 208-10 infra.
4. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6. See text accompanying notes 82-106, 179-93 infra. Of course, given the interpreta-
tions consistently put on such cases, they now, in a sense, stand for the propositions for
which they are cited.
[Vol. 29
19801 EQUAL PROTECTION 669
more extended discussions of due process. 7 But, equal protection
claims presented interpretation questions of their own. A thorough
examination of the way those questions were resolved sheds fur-
ther light on the decisionmaking process of the Court and on the
roots of the equal protection doctrines which have survived to this
day. In that respect it presents an almost ideal case study of the
difficulties involved when the Court enforces imprecise constitu-
tional commands.
I. THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION
In a recent opinion the position of the Supreme Court when
first confronted with claims invoking the equal protection clause
was likened to that of Adam in the Garden of Eden.8 The general
language of the provision and the absence of any antecedents with
developed interpretations that could be applied to it presented the
Court with a new world of constitutional possibilities.9 This situa-
tion was bound to create a temptation to use the clause as the ba-
sis from which the Court could impose on the states its own judg-
ment as to the propriety or impropriety of different kinds of
governmental activity.
This difficulty is one instance of one of the most persistent
7. E.g., Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890).
8. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 779 (1977)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
9. Unlike the due process and privileges and immunities clauses of the fourteenth
amendment the "equal protection" language had no direct counterpart elsewhere in the
Federal Constitution. Nor was it familiar from state constitutions. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT
By JUDICIARY 168 (1977). However, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 did provide that
Christians "demeaning themselves peaceably shall be equally under the protection of law."
Id. (quoting MASS. CONST. art. 3 (1780)). Also consider the following statement from Presi-
dent Jackson's Bank Veto Message of 1832:
Distinctions in society will always exist under every just government. Equality of
talents, of education, or of wealth can not be produced by human institutions. In
the full enjoyment of the gifts of Heaven and the fruits of superior industry,
economy, and virtue, every man is equally entitled to protection by law; but
when the laws undertake to add to these natural and just advantages artificial
distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges to make the rich
richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of society-the farm-
ers, mechanics, and laborers-who have neither the time nor the means of secur-
ing like favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of their
Government. There are no necessary evils in government. Its evils exist only in
its abuses. If it would confine itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its
rains, shower its favors alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor, it
would be an unqualified blessing.
Quoted in J. WHITE, BANKIo LAw: TEACHING MATRsIS 15-16 (1976).
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and intractable problems of constitutional law and judicial re-
view-that is, the need to accommodate the objective of constitu-
tional government to the inherent imprecision of language. Consti-
tutional government is based on the assumption that governmental
power may be defined by written law.10 But where constitutional
words fail to communicate the nature of the limits they are in-
tended to embody, the limitation of government is, to the same
extent, more difficult. In the United States government, where po-
licing of constitutional limits is largely entrusted to the judiciary,
the problem is most acutely that of the Supreme Court as it exer-
cises its authority to invoke the Constitution. The most carefully
drafted language cannot eliminate doubt about its meaning; it can-
not provide an automatic answer to claims of unconstitutional ac-
tivity by the government." The notion, therefore, that the govern-
ment is limited perfectly by impersonal law, and not at all by the
will of the Supreme Court is, at the end, an illusion.
But this imprecision of language is a problem of degree. No
order or prohibition is certain in meaning, but some are far more
specific than others. The Constitution specifies exactly the mini-
mum age for senators.1 2 It sets forth in broad detail the procedure
to be followed on a presidential veto of a bill.13 It prohibits without
further direction the imposition of cruel and unusual punish-
ments.14 Provisions of this last kind create the most severe difficul-
ties for the Supreme Court, as it attempts to maintain limits obvi-
ously intended to be placed on the other branches, without
imposing its own virtually unreviewable will upon the government
and the country.15
Nowhere is this difficulty more severe than in the case of the
10. "Constitutionalism is the name given to the trust which men repose in the power of
words engrossed on parchment to keep a government in order." Hamilton, Constitutional-
ism, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Tm SOCIA. ScIEcas 255 (1937).
11. "One half the doubts in life arise from the defects of language ..... " Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 232 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring). See, e.g., Radin, Statu-
tory Interpretation, 43 HtAv. L. REv. 863 (1930).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
13. Id. § 7, cl. 2.
14. Id. amend. VIL
15. On the other hand, as we come closer to perfecting our constitutional limitations
through precision and detail, we begin to bear another cost in rigidity which is particularly
undesirable in a basic law intended to control well into the future. The result is a compro-
mise between our fear of undefined governmental power and our unwillingness to confine
that power with words which unduly restrict the government in the work we want it to do.
670 [Vol. 29
EQUAL PROTECTION
equal protection clause. When the fourteenth amendment first
came before the Court in 187318 the Court was required to apply a
limitation whose language was obscure in an extreme degree. In
this situation the Court was bound to feel the opposite tugs of its
duty to refer to a law outside itself and the temptation to write its
own constitutional mandate of equality under the guise of
adjudication.
The language of the equal protection clause tells us almost
nothing. Indeed, it seems that the clause cannot reasonably be ap-
plied as if it means only what it says. What is it, as an abstract
matter, to "deny the equal protection of the laws?" The words
seem to indicate that only the application of the laws is to be
equal, not the substance of the laws themselves. But if this were
the meaning of the clause, the most blatant and irrational discrimi-
nation would be permissible so long as it were incorporated in a
duly promulgated law, faithfully applied. Impartial administration
of unequal laws is not an illogical concept and might, indeed, be
preferred to arbitrarily selective enforcement of the same laws. But
this highly limited interpretation has never commended itself to
the Supreme Court.17 Another possible meaning suggested by the
language of the clause would equate "the laws" with the legal sys-
tem as a whole. In this case the clause might be read to insist that
the legal system not be skewed in favor of or against any one indi-
vidual or group. But this interpretation presents enormous difficul-
ties, particularly in determining what kind of imbalance is prohib-
ited, and has never been seriously considered by the Court.
16. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
17. See Tussman & ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rav.
341, 342 (1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 1065, 1170-
71 (1969). Some of the early cases came close to this position at least in the rhetoric chosen.
See Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879); Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584-85 (1882).
This view was repudiated and Pace was overruled in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964).
A reasonable argument may be made that fair administration of some discriminatory
laws merely exacerbates the inequality.
The critic may wish to say that the more fairly the law in question is adminis-
tered, the more this frustrates a principle of wider equality in which he himself
believes, as when a law based upon the principle of discrimination between col-
oured and white men is administered fairly, i.e. with scrupulous regard to equal
treatment within each category, but is thereby itself the cause of inequality be-
tween coloured and white men.
I. BERLIN, CONCMPS AND CATEGORIES: PHmIOSOPHIcAL EssAYs 99 (1978).
1980]
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If we abandon these rather improbable understandings, we are
compelled to the conclusion that the prohibition is directed at the
content of individual laws, at the inequality in treatment which
those laws may require. Indeed the Court soon adopted the not so
obvious formula that "the equal protection of the laws" entails
"the protection of equal laws."'18 But neither can this interpreta-
tion be taken too literally. Certainly not every law which operates
unequally on different people is to be condemned as invalid. It is a
characteristic of law generally that it classifies with happier conse-
quences for some than for others.19 Therefore, the coexistence of
the clause with the survival of the legal system, as commonly un-
derstood, demands that some unequal classifications are improper
but others are not. But here we must stop. The language of the
clause takes us no further.20
Of course the absence of a useful meaning discoverable from
the words of the amendment did not by itself leave the Court with-
out any aid for interpretation. It had long been recognized that the
Court could look to the intention of the framers of the relevant
constitutional language.2' Few subjects in American law have re-
ceived such intense scholarly attention as the legislative history of
the fourteenth amendment.2 2 The variety of sources which prop-
erly should be consulted, the weight to be accorded those sources,
the meanings of the various expressions of intention discovered,
18. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
19. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 779 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Tussman &
ten Broek, supra note 17, at 343.
20. Some commentators, emphasizing the language's command to provide "protection,"
have read it as imposing affirmative obligations on the states: V
Protection of men in their fundamental or natural rights was the basic idea.
Equality was a modifying condition, and the clause in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was a confirmation of the duty of government to protect men in their natu-
ral rights. This clause established the absolute and substantive character of that
duty, despite a use of the word "equal" that seems to give the clause a merely
relative form. Equal denial of protection, that is, no protection at all, is accord-
ingly a denial of equal protection.
J. TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAw 21 (1965). At another point the same author claims: "It
was because the protection of the laws was denied to some men that the word 'equal' was
used. The word 'full' would have done as well." Id. at 237. See Soifer, Protecting Civil
Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 651, 702-05 (1979). For
arguments to the contrary, see R. BERGER, supra note 9, at 183-86.
21. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188-89 (1824).
22. A fairly thorough bibliography of the relevant literature may be found in R. B.R-
GER, supra note 9, at 433-46.
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have all been the subject of long and unresolved debate. Recently
the discussion has been renewed with no more likely prospect of
agreement.2s For the purposes of this article, it is only necessary to
know that the Supreme Court itself, while often acknowledging the
legitimacy of such questions, has never undertaken a serious and
systematic investigation of the original intention as an aid to inter-
pretation.24 Since this article explores not the "true" meaning of
the amendment but rather the way the Court coped with difficult
and obscure constitutional limitations, we can consider the Court's
behavior without evaluating the academic dispute as to the fram-
ers' intention.
Given the difficulties of finding an appropriate literal meaning
and the lack of recourse to original intention, the Court was left
with nothing but an unspecific bar against some kinds of legislative
classifications. It was open for the Court to choose among a vast
number of possible ways of distinguishing valid from invalid classi-
fications. The choices it would make would have critical implica-
tions for the ways in which state governments could handle the
problems they confronted Those choices were necessarily influ-
enced by the way in which the Court understood the basic
problems of constitutional government which have been discussed.
The Court could minimize the risk of unrestricted judicial discre-
tion by establishing, as a matter of construction, specific, well-de-
fined interpretations of the constitutional rule.25 Then, by pursuing
23. See id. Berger's views have been vigorously contested. See, e.g., Soifer, supra note
20.
24. During the period under study it was still possible for judges to consult their own
recollections as to the purpose to be served by the fourteenth amendment. Thus, in the
Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Miller's majority opinion ostensibly relied in great measure
on the "history of the times" which was "[f]ortunately. . . fresh within the memory of us
all." 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67-68 (1873). To the extent that certain assumptions as to the
history were, for that reason, taken for granted, the impact of the judges' unspoken under-
standing cannot be measured nor the extent that their conclusions were explicitly applied to
cases. Justice Miller established the precedent of referring to the intention of the framers in
broad generalities. Id. at 71-72. This style has become the staple of the Court's references to
the fourteenth amendment's legislative history. Such references have not been obviously
influential in deciding uncertain cases. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489
(1954). There have been exceptions among the individual justices who have shown a willing-
ness to delve somewhat more deeply into the available materials. See Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 70-75, 92-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 595-
608, 625-32 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 250-78 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
25. Such judicial construction of limiting models has been recognized in the common
1980]
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a policy of stare decisis, the Court's range of action would be con-
fined. The government as a whole would be more limited, albeit by
a combination of constitutional rules provided by the constitu-
tional document and the judicial model so created. With regard to
equal protection adjudication this limitation would have to be al-
most entirely the creation of the Court. But the history of the
Court's decisions in the period under study will show movement
toward an equal protection position that maximized the Court's
latitude in reviewing legislation on a case-by-case basis. Such a
course could only increase the departure from limited government
inherent in the lack of guidance provided by the equal protection
clause itself.28 This outcome was by no means inevitable. Indeed,
the Court's first decision applying the equal protection guarantee
indicated an opposite direction altogether.
I1. THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES AND Two MODELS OF EQUAL
PROTECTION ADJUDICATION
State laws were first challenged in the Supreme Court as in-
compatible with the fourteenth amendment in the Slaughter-
House Cases, decided in 1873.7 The dramatic and ironic story of
that case has been told many times.2 8 The plaintiffs, New Orleans
butchers, questioned the legality of the Louisiana legislature's
grant of a monopoly for the slaughter of livestock. The Supreme
Court's decision upholding the monopoly is best remembered for
its disposition of the claim that Louisiana had violated the amend-
ment by abridging "the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States." By restricting the meaning of that phrase to cer-
tain rights connecting the citizen to the national government the
law creation of sub-rules for particular application of the broad duty of reasonable care in
tort law. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 129-30 (1961); Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their
Function in the Process of Decision, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 833, 852-54 (1931).
26. The extent to which it is desirable to have more or less sharply defined and stable
limitations on the powers of government-even one with a written constitution-is, itself, a
controversial political judgment. See Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 187
(1981).
27. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
28. E.g., C. FARMAN, RECONSTRUCTION aND REUNION 1864-88 pt. 1 at 1320-63 (VI His-
tory of the Supreme Court of the United States 1971); Franklin, The Foundations and
Meaning of the Slaughterhouse Cases, 18 TuL. L. REv. 1, 218 (1943); Hamilton, The Path
of Due Process of Law, 48 ETHICS 269 (1938); Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities
Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last'?, 1972 WASH. L.Q. 405 (1972).
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Court may have prematurely buried that potentially drastic limita-
tion on state power.2 But, in addition, the Court had to deal with
the plaintiff's claim that the monopoly "enriche[d] seventeen per-
sons and deprive[d] nearly a thousand others of the same class,
and as upright and competent as the seventeen, of the means by
which they earn their daily bread. ."30 and, therefore, denied to
that disfavored thousand the equal protection of the laws.
After going to some length to explain and justify the major-
ity's principal ground of decision, Justice Miller made short work
of the equal protection claim. His brief conclusion as to the mean-
ing of that clause has been cited as a paradigm of bad judicial
forecasting.
31
We doubt very much whether any action of a state not directed by way of
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will
ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a
provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case would be nec-
essary for its application to any other3
2
Justice Miller and the majority solved the problem of limits of the
equal protection clause by confining its reach to racial discrimina-
tion. This clearly defined view of the scope of equal protection may
be seen as one version of a general limiting method. The clause
would be used to invalidate only classifications based on certain
characteristics. This approach will be referred to as the model of
29. The restricted reading of the clause has been deemed improper by later commenta-
tors. See L. TRIBRE, AmmucAN CONSTrrTIONAL LAW 423-24 (1978); Kurland, supra note 28,
at 408-15. But see A. BICmL, Tm MORALITY OF CONSENT 42-47 (1975).
30. 83 U.S. at 56 (argument of John A. Campbell).
31. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PART
I, RIGHTS OF THE PERSON 490-91 (1968).
32. 83 U.S. at 81. Following this well-known statement Justice Miller added this, still
cryptic, amplification:
But as it is a State to be dealt with, and not alone the validity of its laws, we
may safely leave that matter [the applicability of the equal protection clause]
until Congress shall have exercised its power, or some case of State oppression,
by denial of equal justice in its courts, shall have claimed a decision at our
hands.
Id.
This potentially significant limitation on the Court's power under the amendment does not
appear to have been further developed in subsequent cases.
Notwithstanding the limitation quoted in text, Justice Miller, in the arguments before
the Court in County of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R.R. in 1882, denied that the Court had
intended that the protection of the fourteenth amendment, in general, be limited to blacks.
C. FAIRMAN, MR. JusTvcE Mxuza AND THE SuPREME COURT 1862-1890, at 186-87 (1939).
1980] 675
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impermissible classifications. On this view, mere inequality in state
laws was not the concern of the amendment. Only if the state
should base the inequality on a forbidden factor would the clause
come into play. This solution, of course, drew heavily on the con-
cededly primary purpose of the amendment, to restrict official ra-
cial discrimination. It narrowed its potentially enormous scope to
judicially manageable proportions.
But the dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases were in no
mood for a limited view of the fourteenth amendment. The dissent
of Justice Field, while infused with the rhetoric of equality, made
no specific reference to the language of the equal protection
clause.s Justice Bradley paused only to make the unadorned asser-
tion that the monopoly constituted a deprivation of the equal pro-
tection of the laws. 4 The separate dissenting opinion of Justice
Swayne, alone, dealt with the equal protection claim as a discrete
question; but it merely stated that the inequitable distribution of
privileges and immunities expounded in the other dissenting opin-
ions amounted to a denial of equal protection. He noted, moreover,
the fact that the clause's guarantee extended to "any person" pre-
cluded the majority's limitation of the amendment to the protec-
tion of racial minorities.
3 5
From this brief discussion we may infer the existence of an
incipient division over the way the amendment, and particularly
its requirement of equal treatment, was to be understood. In con-
trast to the limiting method which the majority employed, the dis-
senters rejected any narrow restriction. Instead they embraced the
33. The dissenting opinions, particularly that of Justice Field, did not treat the amend-
ment as containing three strictly separate proscriptions. Rather it was seen as a single guar-
antee of fundamental rights identified with United States citizenship. Equality of treatment
was an integral aspect of that citizenship. 83 U.S. at 95-98, 109-10. The same refusal to
analyze the segments of the section separately characterized the famous brief of former Jus-
tice John A. Campbell on behalf of the independent butchers challenging the monopoly.
34. 83 U.S. at 122. In a later case Justice Bradley, looking back, put more emphasis on
the equal protection defects of the Slaughter-House monopoly:
But still more apparent is the violation, by this monopoly law, of the last clause
of the section---'no state shall deny to any person the equal protection of the
laws.' If it is not a denial of the equal protection of the laws to grant to one man,
or set of men, the privilege of foll9wing an ordinary calling in a large community,
and to deny it to all others, it is difficult to understand what would come within
the constitutional prohibition.
Butchers Union Slaughter-House v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 765-66 (1884) (concur-
ring opinion).
35. 83 U.S. at 128-29.
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very breadth and ambiguity of the constitutional language. Thus
Justice Bradley was content merely to quote the clause while Jus-
tice Swayne felt the applicability of the clause to the case at hand
was demonstrated by italicizing the words "any person." This ap-
proach, of course, was well adapted to their objective in that case:
to bring within the amendment's scope a classification they found
odious. But given the need to accommodate the inevitable inequal-
ities of the law, these judges, too, would have to confront the need
for a limiting method of some kind.
That alternative limiting method was foreshadowed in the dis-
senting Justices' opinions with respect to the principal claim that
the monopoly abridged the plaintiffs' privileges and immunities as
citizens of the United States. The majority opinion had forged a
limited version of that constitutional prohibition by restricting its
reach to protection of the relationship between the individual citi-
zen and the federal government. Again the dissenters put forward
a more expansive position, equating privilege and immunities with
"fundamental rights" broadly defined, 6 including the right to
choose and pursue a vocation. They went on, however, to inquire
whether the abridgement of that right by the monopoly legislation
was a reasonable way of achieving a legitimate governmental objec-
tive of the state. 7 Only upon concluding that it was not so justified
was a finding of unconstitutionality proper. Thus, while the dis-
senters asserted an extraordinarily broad category of protected
rights, they also imposed an equally sweeping qualification on
those rights by subordinating them to reasonable police power
regulations.
The fact that the dissenting justices needed such a limitation
became apparent the very next day, when the Court handed down
36. E.g., id. at 95-98, 100-01 (Field, J., dissenting). See Franklin, supra note 28, at 83.
The argument of the independent butchers offered the Court by former Justice Campbell
has been likened to an invitation to incorporate a natural rights philosophy into the Consti-
tution. See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 274-79. It is interesting that the more limited ver-
sion of the amendment was presented by counsel for the Slaughter-House monopoly, Chris-
tian Roselius, whom Professor Franklin described as an anti-slavery Southern Whig and a
positivist-
His escape from the natural law of the abolitionists took the form, then, not of
an acceptance of the fetters for slaves, historically forged by Savigny, but of an
acceptance of the agnosticism or positivism of the actuality of the code civil
louisianais itself. He said he knew nothing but this Code.
Franklin, supra note 28, at 56.
37. 83 U.S. at 87-89 (Field, J., dissenting) and at 119 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
1980]
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its decision in Bradwell v. State.38 In that case an otherwise quali-
fied applicant was denied admission to the practice of law by the
Illinois Supreme Court because she was a married woman. Mrs.
Bradwell brought her appeal to the United States Supreme Court
citing the fourteenth amendment. The Court affirmed with a sepa-
rate concurring opinion by Justice Bradley joined by Justices Field
and Swayne, all Slaughter-House dissenters. The case was argued
and decided solely on allegation of an abridgment of the privileges
and immunities of a citizen of the United States. As such, of
course, it presented no difficulties to the majority in the Slaughter-
House Cases, given their previous narrow construction of privileges
and immunities. For the dissenters, however, who just had de-
clared those privileges and immunities to be coextensive with those
rights which "belong to the citizens of all free governments," and
explicitly had included among those rights a right to earn a liveli-
hood, an affirmance must have come somewhat harder.39 For those
judges the critical difference in the cases was the propriety of the
infringement of that right in light of its contribution to a police
power objective. In his Slaughter-House dissent Justice Bradley
had inquired whether the grant of monopoly was a reasonable ex-
ercise of the power of the state, and had concluded, by reason of
history and economics, that it was instead "onerous, unreasonable,
arbitrary and unjust. ' 40 In Bradwell, making the same inquiry and
referring to history and theology, he concluded that the state's in-
terference with the abstract right was "founded on nature, reason
and experience.' 1 The Slaughter-House monopoly "has none of
the qualities of a police regulation."' 2 The Illinois Supreme Court's
exclusion of women "fairly belongs to the police power of the
State.,,4'
This alternative to the limited conception of privileges and
immunities espoused by the Slaughter-House majority could and
would be easily transposed to the interpretation of equal protec-
tion. With respect to that clause the majority, adopting the model
38. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
39. See generally Corker, Bradwell v. State: Some Reflections Prompted by Myra
Bradwell's Hard Case That Made "Bad Law", 53 WASH. L. REv. 215 (1978).
40. 83 U.S. at 119.
41. Id. at 142.
42. Id. at 119-20.
43. Id. at 142.
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of impermissible classifications, limited its reach to discrimination
on account of race. The competing method of adjudication, which
we will call the model of unjustifiable classifications, would hold
invalid any kind of inequality unless it were part of a reasonable
scheme of police power regulation." The different ramifications of
these two positions for the expansion of judicial power in constitu-
tional review are clear. The model of impermissible classifications
focused on the presence or absence of one, or at least some finite
number, of impermissible classifying traits such as race. As such, it
necessarily restricted the extent to which the Court felt free to ex-
amine other aspects of the challenged legislation. The model of un-
justifiable classifications, on the other hand, would focus on the
propriety of the classification's purpose (whether it was within the
police power) and how well it served that purpose. It thus called
44. Justice Bradley in his circuit court opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases had seen
the constitutional right in the same way.
This right [to pursue an occupation] is not inconsistent with any of those whole-
some regulations which have been found to be beneficial and necessary in every
state.... The next question is: Does the law complained of, and the proceed-
ings under it, conflict with the enjoyment of this fundamental privilege of the
complainants; or is it only such a political and police regulation as it is compe-
tent for a state legislature to make?
Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-
House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652-53 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8408). The distinction was again
made explicit in 1884 when the New Orleans slaughtering monopoly again came before the
Court. This time the former monopolists argued unsuccessfully that a subsequent legisla-
ture's dissolution of their grant was an impairment of the obligation of contract and there-
fore a violation of art. I, § 10, cl. 1. In their concurring opinions Justices Field and Bradley
restated their earlier dissents. Field stated that the dissenters have not
denied that the States possessed the fullest power ever claimed by the most ear-
nest advocate of their reserved rights, to prescribe regulations affecting the
health, the good order, the morals, the peace, and the safety of society within
their respective limits .... [T]he recent amendments to the Constitution have
not changed nor diminished their previously existing power to legislate respect-
ing the public health and public morals.
Butchers' Union Slaughter-House v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. at 754-55 (concurring opin-
ion). Justice Bradley reiterated that the amendment would not touch real police power
regulations:
Suppose a law should be passed forbidding the erection of any bakery, or brew-
ery, or soap manufactory within the fire district, or any other prescribed limits
in a large city;-that would clearly be a police regulation; but would it be a police
regulation to attach to such a law the grant to a single corporation or person of
the exclusive right to erect bakeries, breweries, or soap manufactories at any
place within ten miles of the city? Every one would cry out against it as a pre-
tence and an outrage.
Id. at 761 (concurring opinion).
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for nothing less than a judicial reconsideration of the utility of the
challenged legislation. 5
We have, thus far, seen the justices developing these options
only in the realm of privileges and immunities. The pattern estab-
lished would, however, control the other operative phrases of the
amendment as well.46 In the privileges and immunities context the
more restrictive method was to prevail. With respect to the equal
protection clause, however, the model of unjustifiable classifica-
tions was to compete with the model of impermissible classifica-
tions, and would be, by the end of the period under study, the
dominant mode of adjudication.
Ill. EARLY CASES
The Court employed the model of impermissible classifications
again in 1879 in three decisions dealing with the constitutionality
of all-white juries.'7 In majority opinions by Justice Strong the
Court held that a statutory policy excluding blacks from jury duty
denied the equal protection of the laws to black defendants in
criminal trials and that Congress was authorized under section five
of the amendment to make unlawful the administration of such a
policy by state officials.48 In discussing the reach of the equal pro-
45. These two models will suggest the "two-tier" equal protection model developed by
commentators and eventually adopted by the Court itself in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
The upper tier invokes strict scrutiny and almost certain invalidity on the basis of the kind
of classification alone. The lower is, in theory at least, an inquiry into the relation of the
discrimination to a permissible police power purpose. In their modern incarnations the
method of impermissible classifications has been associated with judicial activism and the
method of unjustifiable classifications with restraint, the opposite of the tendencies de-
scribed in text. But see note 207 infra on the use of the model after the turn of the century.
46. The transformation of broad constitutional rules into vehicles for judicial re-exami-
nation of the aptness of challenged legislation is a recurring theme in American constitu-
tional law. Thus state legislation imposing a burden on commerce would be valid if enacted
in reasonable pursuit of a proper state police power goal. E.g., Willson v. Black Bird Creek
Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). State laws impairing the obligation of contracts
could be saved by the same justification. See note 44 supra. The due process clause in its
classic substantive aspect would, of course, also become a vehicle for judicial review of the
reasonableness, in light of a permissible public purpose, of legislation which impinged on
rights of property and liberty. This is seen in its purest form in the paradigm case of Loch-
ner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See C. HAINES, THE REVivAL OF NATUnAL LAW CON-
czmr 177-95 (1965); B. Twiss, LAwYzas AND TME CONSTITUTION 130-40 (1942).
47. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313
(1879); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
48. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. at 308-12; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 346-48
(dissenting opinion). In Virginia v. Rives, the Court reaffirmed these points but concluded
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tection clause, the majority opinions dealt almost exclusively with
the vice of racial discrimination, per se, repeating the emphasis in
the Slaughter-House Cases on the historical context of the
amendment:
What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for the
black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand
equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for
whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimina-
tion shall be made against them by law because of their color?49
The Court did expand the range of prohibited classifications some-
what. It assumed that the amendment would equally prohibit an
exclusion of white men or "all naturalized Celtic Irishmen."5 0 But
in setting juror qualifications the State was free to limit this duty
"to males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain
ages, or to persons having educational qualifications." 51 The
amendment was unconcerned with such inequalities. "Its aim was
against discrimination because of race or color. ' 52 Only the use of
this forbidden classifying trait would trigger the amendment's
protection.
Again, however, there was a dissenting view. In separate opin-
ions, joined by Justice Clifford, Justice Field continued to press
the broader and less sharply defined interpretation of the four-
teenth amendment which he argued in his dissent in the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases .5  The model of impermissible classifications,
that Congress had not provided for removal to federal court if the all-white jury were not
mandated by state law. 100 U.S. at 319-20. Justice Field, joined by Justice Clifford, dis-
sented in Strauder and Ex parte Virginia and filed a separate concurring opinion in Rives,
arguing, inter alia, that the racial exclusion did not amount to a constitutional violation. Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 360-63 (dissenting opinion).
49. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. at 307.
50. Id. at 308.
51. Id. at 310.
52. Id. The Court, however, did not rule out and, indeed, implicitly left open the possi-
bility that the clause might be put to other purposes. Id.
53. See text accompanying notes 33-38 supra. There is little continuity of faction on
the Court in the developing models of the fourteenth amendment. Field was unusual in his
singular dedication to an expansive interpretation. But the cases discussed in text are typi-
cal in illustrating the shifting majorities. Clifford, who joined Field in these jury cases, was
among the Justices in the Slaughter-House majority. Justices Bradley and Swayne, fellow
dissenters in the earlier case, parted company with Field here. Of course this is easily expli-
cable on the face of things. Swayne and Bradley's activist views of the amendment were in
no way at odds with their position in favor of invalidating racially exclusive juries. If any-
thing, it is Field who, at first glance, seems to have shifted ground. But, as noted in text, at
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based on a forbidden classifying trait, such as race, was far too nar-
row for him. Whereas his more expansive view of the amendment's
coverage served in the earlier case to provide a basis for arguing
the invalidity of classifying legislation, in the jury cases the same
view was marshalled to support the proposition that the challenged
state action was not included in the constitutional prohibition. He
now argued that the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments were
not intended to touch at all the political arrangements of state gov-
ernment, including the operation of the courts." And this position
was made more, rather than less, plausible by virtue of the fact
that these amendments extended beyond mere racial discrimina-
tion. With regard to the equal protection clause he stated:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the State, whether permanent residents
or temporary sojourners, whether old or young, male or female, are to be
equally protected. Yet no one will contend that equal protection to women, to
children, to the aged, to aliens, cin only be secured by allowing persons of the
class to which they belong to act as jurors in cases affecting their interests.
The quality of protection intended does not require that all persons shall be
permitted to participate in the government of the State and the administra-
tion of its laws, to hold its offices or be clothed with any public trusts. As
already said, the universality of the protection assured repels any such
conclusion. 5
Field thus appeared to argue for another variant of the model of
impermissible classification-one based not upon the classifying
trait employed by the state, but rather upon the activity to which
the classification applied. Discrimination with respect to "political
rights" was not restricted. "Political rights," those "aris[ing] from
the form of government and its mode of administration,"5 6 defined
the relationship of citizen and state and included voting, office
holding, and the carrying out of public duties such as jury service.
Only discrimination with respect to "civil rights," those defining
the legal status of private persons, was prohibited. 7 But this ver-
sion of impermissible classifications answered few questions about
a deeper level Field was developing a consistent model of equal protection which would
eventually carry the day.
54. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 358-62 (dissenting opinion).
55. Id. at 36. See also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. at 335 (concurring opinion).
56. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 367 (dissenting opinion).
57. As to the distinction between civil and political rights, see R. BERGER, supra note 9,




the effect of the amendment. Limiting its reach to racial discrimi-
nation drastically curtailed the impact of the amendment's pro-
scriptions. But restricting its operation to discrimination in civil
rights, although leaving all-white jury selection intact, still left
open a vast field of potential unconstitutionality. Field's concep-
tion of civil rights was extremely broad, commensurate with the
wide range of privileges and immunities asserted in his Slaughter-
House dissent, encompassing, among other things, "the acquisition
of property and the pursuit of happiness."58 Social and economic
regulations of every sort would still be open to constitutional scru-
tiny notwithstanding this "limiting" model, the protection of
which was extended to "all persons of every race, color, and condi-
tion." 15 9 Thus, this version of the model did not, itself, provide a
satisfactory solution to the problem of separating valid from inva-
lid legislative classifications. For that, Field would have to have re-
course to the model implicit in the Slaughter-House dissents, the
model of unjustifiable classifications.
Indeed, the Court seems to have already employed this model
in upholding a challenged legislative classification. In the 1877
term, in a brief opinion by Chief Justice Waite, the Court turned
aside a constitutional challenge to a Richmond ordinance which, in
specific terms, forbade the Richmond, Fredricksburg and Potomac
Railroad from operating a steam engine on Broad Street.60 The
Court first found the ordinance not to be an unconstitutional im-
pairment of contract or deprivation of property without due pro-
cess of law. But since the complaining railroad had been singled
out for especially restrictive treatment, an equal protection claim
was presented as well. The Chief Justice disposed of this conten-
tion in a paragraph. He did not, however, do so by arguing that the
clause was applicable only to discrimination on account of race.
Rather, after noting that only the plaintiff operated on Broad
Street, he suggested that safety considerations might well justify
special regulation of this line. "While locomotives may with very
great propriety be excluded from one street, or even from one part
of a street, it would be sometimes unreasonable to exclude them
58. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 367 (dissenting opinion). Field contrasted this scope
with that of the fifteenth amendment which, by its very terms, adopted a model of imper-
missible classification, both as to classifying trait (race) and subject of regulation (the vote).
59. Id. at 368.
60. Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 96 U.S. 521 (1877).
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from all. It is the special duty of the city authorities to make the
necessary discriminations in this particular. 61 It is clear that a
very different technique was being used here from that utilized by
the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases and which would be
called on in the jury cases. It reflected, instead, the approach im-
plicit in the Slaughter-House dissents. The inquiry was not into
the kind of discrimination at issue but into its necessity, its rea-
sonableness, its "propriety."
The same model seems to have been behind the Court's up-
holding in 1879 of Missouri's disparate schemes for criminal ap-
peals.2 In most areas of the state convictions could be appealed
directly to the state Supreme Court. In the St. Louis area, how-
ever, appeal was t6 a local appellate court and further review was
unlikely. As in the street railroad case, the Court's opinion, this
time by Justice Bradley, noted the possibility that different condi-
tions might call for different measures in creating an effective judi-
cial system. The fourteenth amendment guaranteed nothing more
than that "no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and under like circumstances."6 3 Only
by taking account of difference in circumstances and conditions
could a state further "the welfare of all classes within the particu-
lar territory or jurisdiction.""
Both of these cases dealt with the equal protection question
without citation to precedent. They used conclusory rhetoric and
failed to spell out the reasons why the classifications were to be
judged on the basis of their utility in effecting proper police power
objectives. But during the 1884 term two cases were brought before
the Supreme Court challenging the validity of an ordinance of the
city of San Francisco regulating the establishment and operation of
laundries.6 5 The Court upheld the regulation in both cases in opin-
ions by Justice Field. Those opinions contain the first extended
discussion of the model of unjustifiable classifications in equal pro-
61. Id. at 529.
62. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879). The Court also noted, in a rather unworthy
argument, that the fourteenth amendment protected only persons, not geographical areas.
Id. at 30-31.
63. Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 32.
65. The ordinances were part of a long and stubborn pattern of state and municipal
harassment of Chinese residents. See note 87 infra.
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tection adjudication. San Francisco had set licensing and inspec-
tion procedures for all clothes laundries operating within desig-
nated areas of the city. In particular it had made unlawful the
washing and ironing of clothes within these establishments be-
tween 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Because laundries outside the designated
area were not restricted in their hours of operation, an equal pro-
tection question was presented. In Barbier v. Connolly,6 the Court
upheld the regulation as a permissible health and.safety measure
related to the danger of overnight use of fire in certain areas. Jus-
tice Field first unconvincingly asserted that the ordinance was "not
legislation discriminating against anyone" since all persons in simi-
lar conditions were treated alike. 7 But in a subsequent paragraph
he came to grips with the basic incompatibility of truly equal
treatment and any effective regulation under the state's police
power:
Special burdens are often necessary for general benefits-for supplying water,
preventing fires, lighting districts, cleaning streets, opening parks, and many
other objects. Regulations for these purposes may press with more or less
weight upon one than upon another, but they are designed, not to impose
unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon any one, but to promote, with as
little individual inconvenience as possible, the general good. Though, in many
respects, necessarily special in their character, they do not furnish just
ground of complaint if they operate alike upon all persons and property
under the same circumstances and conditions. Class legislation, discriminat-
ing against some and favoring others, is prohibited, but legislation which, in
carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the
sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not
within the amendment."
On its surface, this looks like double talk, but it contains the germ
of a method for determining which legislation imposing special
burdens or granting special benefits is valid notwithstanding the
general injunction against legislative inequalities. Justice Field
conceded the propriety-indeed the necessity-of inequality in
schemes devoted to the general welfare. In such cases the inequal-
ity was merely the incidental fallout from the obviously permissi-
ble business of state government. Such incidental inequality was
different from true "class legislation discriminating against some
and favoring others" which was invalid. The distinction seems to
66. 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
67. Id. at 30-31.
68. Id. at 31-32.
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be between inequality as a means and inequality as an end. There-
fore, at the very beginning of equal protection adjudication, the
identification of invalid discrimination by reference to the objects
such classifications serve can be seen to lead inevitably to consider-
ations of legislative motivation. This problem, of course, is still one
of the thorniest in constitutional law.69
But to base the determination of constitutionality solely on
the asserted presence or absence of a proper governmental pur-
pose, would be an invitation to legislative subterfuge. Surely the
mere recitation or hypothesizing of a police power objective which
might be served by the inequality attacked could not immunize it
from constitutional scrutiny. The clause would prohibit nothing
but artlessness if there were no inquiry into the validity of the as-
serted state purpose.70 Such a judicial investigation might be made
in two ways. One would be to investigate directly the motivation of
the legislature to see whether the inequality was the primary pur-
pose of the legislation rather than its inevitable and incidental by-
product. This was the approach urged by counsel in the second
laundry case of the term, Soon Hing v. Crowley, 1 in which it was
argued that the true purpose of the same ordinance was the special
harassment of the Chinese residents of the city.7 2 But Justice Field
69. See Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law,
15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 953 (1978); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Consti-
tutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions:
A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN D1-
EGo L. REV. 1041 (1978); Tussman & ten Broek, supra note 17, at 356-61; Note, Legislative
Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972). The model of imper-
missible classifications can present motivation questions of its own if the presence or ab-
sence of a certain motivation is crucial in determining whether facially neutral official con-
duct, may in fact be using a forbidden trait. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Cf. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L.
Ray. 1023 (1979).
70. The need for the Court to investigate the actual extent to which a classification
serves a legitimate governmental objective was stated more explicitly in the separate concur-
ring opinions of Justices Field and Bradley in Butchers Union Slaughter-House v. Crescent
City Co., 111 U.S. at 754-55, 761, discussed at note 34 supra. The same reasoning was em-
ployed to justify an investigation into the appropriateness of the asserted police power mea-
sures which invaded protected interests in due process clause adjudication of the same era.
See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887). A similar kind of reasoning continues to be
used in cases where the Court must consider a claim that state regulations impinging on
interstate commerce are sustainable as a legitimate police power measure. See, e.g., Dean
Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
71. 113 U.S. 703 (1885).
72. The plaintiff asserted that 250 of the 275 Chinese laundries in the city were within
[Vol. 29
EQUAL PROTECTION
cast this suggestion aside, questioning the propriety as well as the
practicality of "penetrating into the hearts of men," and noting
that nothing had been shown on the face of the ordinance or its
legislative history to support such a conclusion.73 Any determina-
tion on the improper motive of inequality would have to be re-
stricted to those inferences "disclosed on the face of the acts, or
inferrible from their operation."
74
Justice Field thus signaled the possibility (not. realized in this
case) of a second method of identifying discrimination which is not
justifiable as incident to the proper exercise of the police power.
This method called for an evaluation of how well the discrimina-
tion served the state's legitimate purpose. "The motives of the leg-
islators, considered as the purposes they have in view, will always
be presumed to be to accomplish that which follows as the natural
and reasonable effect of their enactments. 75 But some discrimina-
tory classifications will not naturally and reasonably further the
claimed police power objective. In those cases the mere incanta-
tions of a legislative purpose will not legitimate the discrimination.
The police power justification would not be available and we would
be left with nothing but the rank unjustifiable discrimina-
tion76-"class legislation discriminating against some and favoring
others"--and nothing more.
Here we see translated to equal protection adjudication, as the
model of unjustifiable classifications, the approach first adum-
brated in the dissenting opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases
and Justice Bradley's concurrence in Bradwell. In that case, he
asked whether the state's act resulting in the unequal treatment
complained of "fairly belonged to the police power of the state" or
whether it was "onerous, unreasonable, arbitrary and unjust." In
the laundry cases, the ordinance was not unconstitutional discrimi-
nation because it was nothing more than the ordinary legislative
the designated area and that it was well known that the Chinese were in the habit of work-
ing late at night. Transcript of Record on Certificate of Division at 5. Brief for Plaintiff in
Error at 19-22. As to the campaign of municipal harassment of Chinese, see note 87 infra.
73. 113 U.S. at 710-11.
74. Id. at 710 (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. See Butchers Union Slaughter-House v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. at 761 (concur-
ring opinion), in which Justice Bradley presumed that discriminatory legislation which




work of the state.
Police power regulation and unconstitutional activity were
thus seen as mutually exclusive categories.77 Prohibited discrimina-
tion was that which was unredeemed by a proper public justifica-
tion and which had to be treated, therefore, as discrimination for
its own sake. This approach can be understood as one that was
concerned with discrimination solely based on hostility or vindic-
tiveness towards those disadvantaged. Since such motive would
rarely be overt, it was necessary to identify such discrimination by
evaluating the plausibility of the claim that it was something else.
This necessarily entailed an evaluation of how well the classifica-
tion served the police power interest.7 8 Here, then, is the theoreti-
cal basis for the model of unjustifiable classifications. Classifica-
tions were not good or bad according to the classifying traits they
employed or the interests they affected. The result of examining
the legislative motive by reference to the legislation's effects was to
find them good or bad as they served or failed to serve legitimate
state interests.79 Classifications reasonable in light of these inter-
ests were permissible; unreasonable ones were prohibited. This ju-
dicial interpretation effectively rewrote the equal protection clause
in terms equivalent to those of the equality provision of the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789: "Men
are born, and always continue, free and equal in respect of their
rights. Civil distinctions, therefore, can be founded only on public
77. See B. Twiss, supra note 46, at 31-32. It has been suggested that in this era it was
generally assumed that the Civil War Amendments did not change the core federalist notion
that states were vested with an irreducible and inviolable set of powers. See Benedict, Pre-
serving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 Sup. CT. Rav. 39. The equal
protection and due process cases also seem to embrace a companion assumption that the
police power of the states excluded any redistributive purpose. See B. Twiss, supra, at 83-
89, 139; McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations:
Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIsT. 970, 978-
81 (1975).
78. The reasons for the kind of inquiry into the rationality of the challenged legislation,
discussed in text, suggest that it may be inaccurate to assume that the requirement that
valid classifications have a rational basis in legitimate state power can be entirely separated
from a ban on improperly motivated legislation. See Ely, supra note 69, at 1222-23. Rather
the absence of a rational basis may be viewed as a surrogate for a direct finding of unconsti-
tutional motivation. See J. ELY, DEmOCRACY AND DIsTRusT 251 n.69 (1980).
79. See Clark, supra note 69, at 978-84, 1037-38; Ely, The Centrality and Limits of
Motivation Analysis, 15 SAN DIEGO L. Rv. 1155, 1156-57 (1972); Perry, supra note 69, at
1071; Simon, supra note 69.
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utility.180 This idea underlay equal protection analysis in the pe-
riod under consideration and, indeed, thereafter.
But we have yet to see the model in action. The classifications
tested in all of the cases discussed were valid under either of the
competing models posited. The test of the model of unjustifiable
classifications would be its utilization to strike down a classifica-
tion. This did not occur until 1886 in the great case of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins.8 1
IV. YICK Wo
Yick Wo v. Hopkins is cited and quoted in case after case for a
number of important propositions, many of only tangential impor-
tance in the decision itself. It is cited for the extension of four-
teenth amendment rights to noncitizens, 2 for the application of
the equal protection clause to racial discrimination against groups
other than blacks,83 and, drawing upon an obiter dictum of an ex-
treme sort, for the importance of the political franchise as a "fun-
damental political right, because preservative of all rights.
'84
Most prominently, however, Yick Wo is remembered for the
assertion that the enforcement of a law neutral on its face may
amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws where the
law is administered so as to discriminate on the basis of race "with
an evil eye and an unequal hand." 85 This conclusion seems a logical
extension of the model of impermissible classifications based on
race, expounded above. But a reading of the complete text of the
Court's opinion reveals that its condemnation of racial discrimina-
80. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CrIZEN § 1 (1789).
81. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
82. Id. at 369. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971).
83. 118 U.S. at 369. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90, 292
(opinion of Justice Powell).
84. 118 U.S. at 370. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 562.
85. 118 U.S. at 373-74. This certainly is the modern understanding of the case's signifi-
cance both by the Court itself, see, e.g., Personnel Adm'r. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 275
(1979), and by commentators, J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 528, 551 (1978). Indeed, so prevalent is this view that most modern constitu-
tional law casebooks edit the case down to this point of text alone. See J. BARRON & C.
DIENES, CONSTITUT7ONAL LAW: PRINCEPLES AND POLICIEs 587 (1975); P. BREST, PROCESSES OF
CONSTrruTIONAL DECISIONAKING 489-91 (1975); G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 693-94
(9th ed. 1975); P. KAUPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 777-78 (4th ed. 1972). But see E. BARRETT,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 766-69 (5th ed. 1977); P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. HOWE, & E.
BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 869-71 (4th ed. 1977).
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tion in the administration of the challenged law was a secondary
theme. The major focus of the opinion took a very different ap-
proach, one which strongly suggests the conclusion that the ordi-
nance was condemned on its face, under an application of the
equal protection clause in keeping with the model of unjustifiable
classifications. 6
The ordinance challenged in Yick Wo was another feature of
San Francisco's scheme of laundry regulation. Chinese immigration
into California during a period of economic depression had re-
sulted in violent hostility toward the Oriental population. The or-
dinances dealing with laundry operations were part of an unrelent-
ing series of legal harassments in the form of municipal ordinances,
state laws and state constitutional provisions.8 7 The particular reg-
86. The opinion was one of the best known works of Justice Stanley Matthews who
served on the Court from 1881 to 1889. He generally sided with the activist pro-business
majority of the Court, the most prominent member of which was Justice Field. See Filler,
Stanley Matthews, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNrrE STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969,
1357-60 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969).
87. The hostility with which California regarded its Chinese residents was reflected in a
persistent series of measures designed to deter their immigration, to minimize the extent to
which they could compete with citizens, and generally to make their lives uncomfortable.
The city of San Francisco, the most important center of Chinese population, was particu-
larly active in anti-Chinese legisldtion. For example, the city repeatedly passed "cubic air"
ordinances (over the veto of the Mayor) calling for a minimum of 500 cubic feet of space per
resident in dwelling places. The ordinance was directed at the crowded living conditions in
the Chinese quarter. The officials were chagrined, however, when upon enforcement the Chi-
nese declined to pay the fines levied, preferring jail sentences. In response the city passed
(over the Mayor's veto) the "queue" ordinance to make imprisonment a more drastic pun-
ishment. See M. COOLMGE, CHINESE IMMIGRATION 261-62 (1909); Sandmeyer, California
Anti-Chinese Legislation and the Federal Courts: A Study in Federal Relations, 5 PAc.
HisT. REV. 189, 198-99 (1936). One version of the "queue" 6rdinance was found unconstitu-
tional in the United States Circuit Court in a well known opinion by Justice Field. Ho Ah
Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D.Cal. 1879) (No. 6546) discussed at text accompanying
notes 112-16 infra.
A particular target of these municipal impositions was the hand laundry business which
was dominated by Chinese. The ordinance at issue in Yick Wo called for all laundries to be
housed in buildings of one story with twelve-inch walls of brick or stone, and with roofs,
doors and window sills of metal. Laundries failing those specifications could operate only
with the consent of the Board of Supervisors. This ordinance was enacted in 1880. Two
years later the ordinance was amended to prohibit all laundries in certain districts unless
they were recommended by twelve citizens and taxpayers resident within a block of the
proposed site. This law was held invalid for obscure reasons in a Circuit Court opinion by
Justice Field. In re, Quong Woo, 13 F. 229 (C.C.D.Cal. 1882).
In 1884 a further amendment imposed the hours restrictions upheld in Barbier v. Con-
nolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885), and Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885), discussed at text
accompanying notes 71-74 supra. See Brief for Respondent-Defendant in Error at 91-92,
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356; Sandmeyer, supra, at 209-10. See generally C. SWISHER,
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ulation attacked was part of an 1880 ordinance which made unlaw-
ful the operation of a laundry in buildings other than those made
of brick or stone "without having first obtained the consent of the
board of supervisors. ' ' " Yick Wo operated such a laundry notwith-
standing the board of supervisors' refusal to consent. He was ar-
rested, convicted and, failing to pay the $10 fine, imprisoned. His
writ of habeas corpus was discharged by the California Supreme
Court which held, inter alia, that the legislation was valid on the
authority of Barbier v. Connolly and Soon Hing v. Crowley.9 In a
companion case, Wo Lee, imprisoned for violating the same ordi-
nance, sought his release in the United States Circuit Court for the
District of California. There, Judge Sawyer expressed the opinion
that the statute was unconstitutional but, deferring to the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, also discharged the writ.90 In deciding the
cases on appeal, the Supreme Court took as admitted certain facts
about the operation and effect of the regulation. About 320 laun-
dries existed in the city of which 240 were owned by Chinese.
About 300 laundries were constructed of wood and therefore sub-
ject to the consent of the board; 200 Chinese laundrymen had peti-
tioned for consent and all were denied. All but one of the applica-
STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAw 205-39 (1930) (Phoenix ed. 1969).
California's hostility to the Chinese did not restrict itself to legal action. The state gen-
erally and San Francisco in particular, were the scene of anti-Chinese demonstrations and
riots. See M. COOLMGE, supra, at 266-68; L. CHriN, A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE IN CALIFOR-
NrA: A SYLLABuS 25 (Chinn ed. 1969). California government officials pressed for tightening
federal restrictions on immigration. The official attitude is reflected in the statement of a
San Francisco representative before a committee of Congress on the subject:
The burden of our accusation against them is that they come in conflict with our
labor interests; that they can never assimilate with us; that they are a perpetual
unchanging, and unchangeable alien element that can never become homoge-
nous; that their civilization is demoralizing and degrading to our people; that
they degrade and dishonor labor; that they can never become citizens, and that
an alien, degraded labor class, without desire to citizenship, without education,
and without interest in the country it inhabits, is an element both demoralizing
and dangerous to the community within which it exists.
C. SANDAEYER, THE Ai.-CHmNEsa Movzmarr xN CALnmoRN 25 (1939). In 1879 a referendum
in which state voters expressed themselves on the subject of immigration resulted in a vote
against the Chinese of 150,000 to 900 although there were some questions as to whether the
issue had been fairly phrased. Id. at 62-63.
See note 99 infra on the anti-exhumation ordinance and note 132 infra on the treat-
ment of Chinese in the 1879 state constitution.
88. 118 U.S. at 358.
89. In re Yick Wo, 68 Cal. 294, 305, 9 P. 139, 145-46 (1885).
90. In re Wo Lee, 26 F. 471, 476-77 (C.C.D.Cal. 1886).
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tions of non-Chinese were granted.9 1 Counsel for Yick Wo
therefore argued that the "ordinance in question, like the pan-
ther's foot, looks harmless in repose, but not so in action.
9 2
The immediate focus of the Court's opinion by Justice Mat-
thews, however, was not the operation of the ordinance but its
terms. The major defect was the nature of the authority granted
the board. The ordinance prescribed no standards or guidance of
any kind with respect to the cases in which consent should be
given or withheld. The Court rejected the city's interpretation of
the ordinance:93 that permission was to be granted or withheld
based upon an evaluation of the fire risk in each building.
There is nothing in the ordinances which points to such a regulation of the
business of keeping and conducting laundries. They seem intended to confer,
and actually do confer, not a discretion to be exercised upon a consideration
of the circumstances of each case, but a naked and arbitrary power to give or
withhold consent, not only as to places, but as to persons."
Given this interpretation the ordinance was fatally distinguishable
from the regulation of laundry hours upheld in Barbier and Soon
Hing that had been treated principally as fire prevention measures
and only incidentally as a discrimination. 5 The Court also distin-
guished cases upholding a state's power to condition liquor sales on
the obtaining of a license. The Court found such regulations were
understood to call for an evaluation of the character of the appli-
cant.96 They were classifications of the safe and the unsafe, the fit
and the unfit: "purely. . .police regulation[s], within the compe-
tency of any municipality possessed of the ordinary powers belong-
ing to such bodies.19 7 Under the model of unjustifiable classifica-
tions these discriminations were therefore valid.
But the same could not be said of the ordinance challenged in
Yick Wo:
91. 118 U.S. at 359. These statistics, which were extremely important if the critical
aspect of the decision were its application, were, in fact, hotly contested by the city and may
have been the result of a mere pleading error. The city argued in its brief that the allega-
tions were false and that actually only two permits had been issued, albeit both to white
men. Brief for Respondents-Defendants in Error at 10-11, 103, 105-06.
92. Brief for Appellant and Plaintiff in Error at 12.
93. Brief for Respondents-Defendants in Error at 37-40, 110.
94. 118 U.S. at 366.
95. Id. at 367.
96. Id. at 368.
97. Id. at 367.
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[I]t divides the owners or occupiers [of wooden laundries] into two classes,
not having respect to their personal character and qualifications for the busi-
ness, nor the situation and nature and adaptation of the buildings them-
selves, but merely by an arbitrary line, on one side of which are those who are
permitted to pursue their industry by the mere will and consent of the super-
visors, and on the other those from whom that consent is withheld, at their
mere will and pleasure. And both classes are alike only in this, that they are
tenants at will, under the supervisors, of their means of living.98
Such a classification, of course, could not be understood as an
ordinary measure for advancing the health, safety, or morals of the
public. No standards in the ordinance would lead to excluding a
business that posed any particular threat to those interests. The
ordinance provided the board with power to discriminate, pure and
simple-not as an inevitable incident of the ordinary business of
lawmaking under the police power. The city Wad argued strenu-
ously that this was not the case and that the power given was one
to be used "to regulate a dangerous business by a consent which
should be granted for proper reasons and denied in their ab-
sence."99 But the Court read the ordinance for itself and saw noth-
ing in the text to support the city's contention. If the object was
98. Id. at 368.
99. Brief for Respondents-Defendants in Error at 110 (emphasis in original). The ordi-
nance's object, it was argued, "was to prevent our people from being burned in their beds at
night by careless and irresponsible people using dangerous fires in wooden shanties so in-
flammable that no underwriter would insure them." Id. at 37. The city's argument that the
ordinance was a mere safety measure, of course, could not be taken very seriously given the
pattern of anti-Chinese municipal actions both before and after this ordinance. See note 87
supra. The city revealed itself even in its brief, which was peppered with attacks on the
Chinese association, the Tung Hing Tong, Brief for Respondents-Defendants in Error at 17-
20, and included the following profession of interracial amity.
Why should we want to destroy the chinese laundry business? Do we not volun-
tarily give them our clothes to wash? Have we not given them three-fourths of
the laundry business of San Francisco? We take them into our families as cooks
and butlers, and into our churches and sunday-schools, and they sleep with us
(temporarily) in our cemetaries.
Id. at 95.
The last reference apparently is to the custom of the Chinese to exhume, when possible,
the bodies of the dead for reburial in China. See M. COOLIDGE, supra note 87, at 261. Indeed
the California authorities were not content to let the Chinese alone even in this regard. A
municipal ordinance, and later a state law, prohibited the movement of dead bodies without
a permit from the municipal authorities granted only on compliance with elaborate health
precautions and the payment of a substantial fee. The statute was upheld against a consti-
tutional challenge in the United States Circuit Court. In re Wong Yung Quy, 2 F. 624
(C.C.D.Cal. 1880). See M. COOLIDGE, supra note 87, at 264; C. S~ADMEyEn, supra note 87, at
54-55.
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public safety the ordinance was entirely unsuited to it.1°0 It would
not, therefore, be treated as a police power regulation but rather as
rank discrimination. It must be noted that this determination was
made and the ordinance clearly condemned, without reference to
the board's racially discriminatory administration of the ordinance.
This is not to say that the admissions as to racial discrimina-
tion under the ordinance did not influence the Court. The opinion
suggested that alternate grounds were open for the deci-
sion-either because the statute was void on its face or because its
administration amounted to unlawful discrimination even if the or-
dinance were "fair on its face and impartial in appearance." 101 But
the discussion of the latter ground, considered in the context of the
whole opinion, may also be understood as the concluding piece of a
single argument. In finding that the unguided discretion left to the
board created an unconstitutional defect, the Court quoted at
length and with approval the decision of the Maryland Supreme
Court in City of Baltimore v. Radecke.10 2 That opinion discussed a
similar power, vested in city officials allowing the revocation of
permits for the operation of steam engines. The state court found
such a power inconsistent with the furtherance of police power
objectives since it was in no way calculated to provide "safety and
security." Indeed its exercise "may proceed from enmity or
prejudice, from partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism and
other improper influences and motives easy of concealment and
difficult to be detected and exposed."103
It was directly from this statement of the opportunity for
abuse presented by the ordinance that the opinion proceeded to
consider its discriminatory administration. Given its lack of stan-
dards, the ordinance could not reasonably advance the goals of the
police power. Instead it provided an opportunity for discrimination
for no reason other than to favor those benefitted or injure those
disadvantaged. The thrust of the opinion was that this was defect
enough. The discrimination need not be shown actually to have
been put to any particular obnoxious use. The potential for such
use was obvious. And in this case, given the admissions, there was
100. 118 U.S. at 366.
101.P Id. at 373-74.
102. 49 Md. 217 (1878), cited in 118 U.S. at 372.
103. Quoted in 118 U.S. at 373.
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no need to "reason from the probable to the actual. '10 4 The dem-
onstration that the injury was imposed on a particular racial group
merely confirmed the fact that the Court was confronted with a
case of discrimination for its own sake rather than for the general
good: "The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it
is shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for
it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the
petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is not
justified." 10 5
The fact of racial discrimination, therefore, does not substitute
for but supplements the defect already discussed. It is not the
presence of race but the absence of justification which is para-
mount. Yick Wo invalidated, for the first time, according to the
model of unjustifiable classifications, discrimination without
acceptable reasons, that is, discrimination without sufficient
grounding in the police power of the state.10
V. DISTINGUISHING THE MODELS
While an examination of the opinion in Yick Wo v. Hopkins
seems to support the ascendancy of the model of unjustifiable clas-
sifications, it also suggests the distinction between that model and
104. Id.
Yet another interpretation of the Court's reasoning is consistent with both aspects of
the discussion. This would be a conclusion that the Court's holding was only as to the stat-
ute as applied but that the vice perceived was not the impermissibility of the racial trait
used but the unjustifiability of such a classification in terms of the police power. As to the
necessary connection of these two facets of racial classification see text accompanying notes
107-25 infra. In Yick Wo, however, the major part of the'opinion appears to be entirely
independent of the admitted facts of the ordinance's administration.
105. 118 U.S. at 374. The Circuit Court decision of Judge Sawyer had put the relation-
ship of the two kinds of defects succinctly- "And the uncontradicted petition shows that all
Chinese applications are in fact denied, and those of Caucasians granted; thus in fact mak-
ing the discriminations in the administration of the ordinance which its terms permit." In
re Wo Lee, 26 F. at 473-74 (emphasis in original). Similarly the brief on behalf of Yick Wo
and Wo Lee coupled the claims of racial discrimination with the arbitrary character of the
power granted the Board: "He who would wash clothes for hire in a frame building any-
where within thie broad limits of San Francisco county must, without light, court the smiles
of caprice and grapple prejudice." Brief for Appellant-Plaintiff in Error at 3.
106. This aspect of the opinion has not gone entirely unnoticed. See McCurdy, supra
note 77, at 978, in which it is remarked that in Yick Wo "the major components of Field's
Slaughter-House Cases dissent received the approbation of the court." This was also the
understanding of more contemporaneous commentators. 4 HARv. L. REv. 236 (1890). The
case was also cited by the Court in this period for both of the points discussed in text.
Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 186 (1900).
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the rival model posited-the model of impermissible classifica-
tions-may not be real, at least when the latter model is premised
on the illegitimacy of racial classifications. Put more precisely, the
objection to discrimination on grounds of race may be merely a
special case of the objection to classifications not reasonably re-
lated to a police power objective. The assimilation of the two mod-
els becomes complete by acceptance of the proposition that race is
never a relevant basis for a government's distinguishing between
persons. Under this assumption, a distinction based on race is ipso
facto an unjustifiable classification and therefore invalid. This way
of understanding the objection to racial discrimination entails as a
necessary conclusion that one governmental end, the relative sub-
jugation of blacks and elevation of whites, must be deemed
illegitimate.
10 7
This is one application of the general proposition that the
mere preference of one group over another, that is, legislation
based only on favoritism or on spite, is outside the scope of proper
governmental activity. The objection to unjustifiable discrimina-
tion implies that discrimination is an evil, albeit a tolerable one in
the pursuit of other state objectives. But discrimination requires
justification; it never justifies itself.108
This view of racial classifications, as an example of unjustifi-
able classifications rather than objectionable per se, is consistent
107. Cf. Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidis-
crimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. RV. 1, 6-12 (1976) (arguing that racial discrimination is
attended by vices other than irrationality).
108. See text accompanying notes 77-80 supra. Therefore under the fourteenth amend-
ment equality of treatment was understood to be the norm of governmental activity and
inequality a departure from that norm which had to be justified. This has long been an
axiom of liberal political theory. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, TiEATISE OF CIvm GOVERNMENT 85, 95
(Appleton-Century-Crofts ed. 1937); J. BAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 507 (1971); Isaiah Ber-
lin has put in this way the idea that the presumptive evil of inequality really is "self-
evident":
The assumption is that equality needs no reason, only inequality does so; that
uniformity, regularity, similarity, symmetry, the functional correlation of certain
characteristics with corresponding rights of which Wollheim speaks, need not be
specifically accounted for, whereas differences, unsystematic behaviour, change
in conduct, need explanation and, as a rule, justification. If I have a cake and
there are ten persons among whom I wish to divide it, then if I give exactly one
tenth to each, this will not, at any rate automatically, call for justification;
whereas if I depart from this principle of equal division I am expected to pro-
duce a special reason.
I. BERLIN, supra note 17, at 84. See French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen,
§ 1, at text accompanying note 80 supra.
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with the views of Justice Field, probably the most articulate and
influential advocate of the model of unjustifiable classifications.
That Field was not acutely offended by racial discrimination itself
is evident from his dissents in the all-white jury cases.109 It is true
that Field is remembered for a number of decisions rendered while
sitting on the California Supreme Court and the United States Cir-
cuit Court which protected the rights of Chinese residents against
racial discrimination.11 0 His sincerity in objecting to the oppression
of Chinese immigrants in those cases need not be doubted, but the
legal bases of those decisions were usually the overriding protec-
tion granted Chinese residents under United States treaty obliga-
tions.1 ' His best known decision on this subject invalidated the
San Francisco "queue ordinance" that required prisoners in the lo-
cal jail to have their hair cut to within an inch of the scalp.1 1 2 The
effect was to work a particularly powerful punishment on Chinese
men who valued the long queues in which their hair was customa-
rily braided. This ordinance was invalidated in an opinion by Field
sitting on the Circuit Court. He found it to be intended especially
to impose pain and disgrace on Chinese prisoners and to be, there-
fore, a violation of the fourteenth amendment.118 But in this case,
as well, the utility of the measure in effectuating police power pur-
poses was material. The equal protection determination, however,
was an alternate holding. The ordinance was also declared invalid
109. See text accompanying notes 53-58 supra. Similarly a letter from Field to John
Norton Pomeroy dated April 14, 1882, commenting on President Arthur's veto of the Chi-
nese Exclusion Act shows a less attractive side of the Justice's views on the Chinese in
America:
It must be apparent to every one, that it would be better for both races to live
apart-and that their only intercourse should be that of foreign commerce. The
manners, habits, mode of living, and everything connected with the Chinese pre-
vent the possibility of their ever assimilating with our people .... You know I
belong to the class, who repudiate the doctrine that the country was made for
the people of all races. On the contrary, I think it is for our race-the Caucasian
race. We are obliged to take care of the Africans; because we find them here, and
they were brought here against their will by our fathers. Otherwise, it would be a
very serious question, whether their introduction should be permitted or
encouraged.
Quoted in H. GRAHAM, EvERYmAN's CONSvrru=ON 105 (1968).
110. But see Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534, 582 (1862) (Field, J., dissenting). See
generally C. SWIsHER, supra note 87, at 205-39.
111. See Id.
112. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D.Cal. 1879) (No. 6546). For the back-
ground of the ordinance, see note 87 supra.
113. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. at 255.
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as beyond the municipal power delegated by the state. State stat-
ute provided that the city's power to punish crimes was to be lim-
ited to fine, forfeiture, or imprisonment. The haircuts fell outside
any of these permitted categories. Moreover the measure could not
be interpreted as anything but punishment. It was not justifiable
as a health or discipline regulation. Justice Field felt the ordinance
was in no way adapted to these purposes and such concerns, in any
event, were committed to the prison authorities, not to the city
officials who had passed the challenged rule.114
The vice of racial discrimination, therefore, while "equally
conclusive" 1  was unnecessary to the decision in the "queue" case.
But Field concluded that the atmosphere surrounding the passage
of the ordinance and its application in practice made it plain that
it was directed exclusively against Chinese, as to whom it consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment. While Field did not expressly
employ any form of the model of unjustifable classifications, the
opinion showed a concern with the propriety of the haircutting re-
quirement as a means towards an accepted state objective. First,
since more severe punishment was imposed on only one group for
the commission of identical crimes, an inference was possible that
the measure was not really necessary to accomplish the ends of the
criminal law. Second, the separate regulation of alien nationals was
the exclusive business of the federal government. In making this
point, Field contrasted the state's power to "exclude from its limits
paupers and convicts of other countries, persons incurably dis-
eased, and others likely to become a burden on its resources...
[and perhaps,] persons whose presence would be dangerous to its
established institutions. But there its power ends." 116 Discrimina-
tion for these police power purposes was presumably proper, but
hostile and spiteful legislation against the Chinese could not be so
justified.
This opinion, therefore, is compatible with Justice Field's po-
sition embracing the model of unjustifiable classifications and does
not explicitly or implicitly condemn racial classification merely as
such-as would be the case with an application of the model of
impermissible classifications. This is consistent with his later deci-
114. Id. at 253-54.
115. Id. at 255.




sion in the Soon Hing case in which he found an ordinance limit-
ing hours of laundry operation valid notwithstanding the highly
plausible claim that it was, in fact, directed against Chinese.1 7 The
critical difference was that in Soon Hing he was able to find that
there was a reasonable police power objective from the face of the
ordinance. In the "queue" case he could find no such explanation.
This deficiency and not the racial character of the discrimination
condemned it.
The foregoing discussion supports the contention that Yick
Wo was only incidentally a decision invalidating racial discrimina-
tion. Although both models discussed would support the Yick Wo
result, the fact that the Supreme Court seemed to settle on the
model of unjustifiable classifications is a matter of significance.
First, it indicated the precarious basis of the idea that racial classi-
fications themselves were invalid. Under that model their invalid-
ity must have rested on the assumption that race was never a rele-
vant criterion in pursuing a state police power goal. This
assumption could, and, it may be argued, did, change.1 s Since it
was not the use of race itself which caused the constitutional de-
fect, but only its failure to contribute to a proper state function,
the way was open to sustain "reasonable" racial classification.119
From another perspective, the importance of the choice of
model would be revealed not in the classifications which it would
lead the Court to sustain, but in those which would be struck
down. The most important feature of the model of impermissible
classifications is its ability to confine the discretion of the Court. It
would lead to automatic approval of any legislative classification
not implicating the finite number of forbidden traits or protected
interests. No occasion for further examination would exist once the
117. Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710 (1885). For the background of anti-Chi-
nese legislation, see note 87 supra. Counsel for Soon Hing pressed heavily on the racial
motivation of the law citing particularly the "queue" case and Justice Field's assertion that
"[w]hen we take our seats on the bench we are not struck with blindness, and forbidden to
know as judges what we see as men." Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 19-24. See C. SWISHER,
supra note 87, at 227-29.
118. See text accompanying notes 179-202 infra.
119. Cf. Brest, supra note 107, at 6-12; Tussman & ten Broek, supra note 17, at 353-56.
The same question was renewed under a somewhat different doctrinal apparatus in the re-
cent "affirmative action" cases. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979) (racial discrimination under Title VII); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438




presence or absence of such a factor were determined. The model
of unjustifiable classifications possesses just the opposite qualities.
It opened for the Court a field of inquiry of extensive latitude. The
Court had first to determine whether the claimed goal of the classi-
fication was permissible, given the elastic definition of the police
power. More importantly, it required the Court to test the reasona-
bleness of the classification as a means to the state objective that
the Court found legitimate. This inquiry was necessarily an empiri-
cal one, depending on the circumstances in which the regulation
was to operate. The model thus involved the Court in that difficult
and open-ended factual exploration and evaluation of technique
that is classically the function of the legislature.120 Contentions as
to the reasonableness of legislative schemes are infinitely arguable
and must be settled ultimately not by recourse to a rule of decision
but by consultation of interests.21
This is not to say that the choice of model would automati-
cally determine the breadth of judicial supervision of legislation.
The model of impermissible classification would only restrict the
Court if the list of impermissible factors were a short and closed
one. Otherwise the vehicle for judicial intervention would be
merely transferred to decisions about the content of that category
of factors. 22 By the same token, the model of unjustifiable classifi-
cations was capable of being applied with great deference toward
the legislative determination of reasonableness. 23 Still the ease of
manipulation and the opportunities for ad hoc judicial review seem
far greater with the latter model. It had built into it many more of
120. See Tussman & ten Broek, supra note 17, at 346-47; Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, supra note 17, at 1076-1132.
121. One commentator has gone so far as to say that the test of requiring a rational
basis for concluding that the classification serves a proper governmental objective imposes
no real restraint at all given the potential for definitional twisting. See Note, supra note 69,
at 128. See also Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. Rav. 197, 201-22 (1976). As
to the relative desirability of models of constitutional adjudication allowing more or less
liberty to the court, see Kay, supra note 26.
122. To the extent that equal protection questions utilizing "strict scrutiny" are analo-
gous to impermissible classifications, this kind of dispute is evident in the modern cases.
See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (classification of aliens with respect to
teaching positions does not merit strict scrutiny). Contra id. at 84 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1977)(classifications with respect to
right to marry merit strict scrutiny). Contra id. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
123. See note 207 infra on the use of the model of unjustifiable classifications after the
turn of the century.
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the features that a court desiring to expand its discretion would
wish to consider in challenging legislation. 24 The potential use of
the equal protection model of unjustifiable classifications inte-
grated readily with the manner of deciding the validity of statutes
that has come to be known as substantive due process. In both
cases the Court translated the textual proscriptions into a rule of
reason with largely undefined criteria for constitutionality. The
consequences for the scheme of constitutional government dis-
cussed at the outset are clear. As the Court seized the opportuni-
ties the model presented, the powers of government would be re-
stricted not by known and relatively stable rules but by the
changing judgment of members of the Court about the appropri-
ateness and effectiveness of the exercise of that power. 125
VI. THE EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE FIELD
To this point we have observed the development of the model
of unjustifiable classifications, but we have yet to see it applied as
a means of enforcing against the states the Court's view of the
proper functions of government and the proper methods of execut-
ing those functions. In fact, however, by the time the Supreme
Court had decided Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Justice Field had already
put the model to this more predictable use in two decisions in the
federal Circuit Court of California. In those cases railroad compa-
nies challenged California's property tax valuation rule.126 The
124. We are thus dealing not with absolute categories but with tendencies. Perhaps a
court attracted to an activist mode of review will always develop a doctrinal device to ac-
commodate it. But it is not implausible to think that a fully developed restraining model
together with a reluctance to scrap casually the Court's policy of stare decisis will at least
impede movement in that direction. See J. ELY, supra note 78, at 112 ("But it's a very bad
lawyer who supposes that manipulability and infinite manipulability are the same thing.").
125. Of course, the impact of such a role for the Court in the particular era under study
is thought to be a product of the the Justices' own economic and political philosophies as to
the proper roles of the individual and the state. The effect of the imposition of this view
under the constitutional licenses of the fourteenth amendment, the contracts clause and the
commerce clause is commonly understood to be the creation of a judicial censor against the
developing economic and social regulations designed to reduce the inequalities and disloca-
tions arising in the wake of rapid economic change and industrialization. See C. HMANEs,
supra note 46, at 149-65.
126. County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 18 F. 385 (C.C.D.Cal. 1883);
County of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. Ry., 13 F. 722 (C.C.D.Cal. 1882). The Supreme Court
affirmed the former case and a companion case in opinions which avoided the constitutional
issue by basing the decisions on the improper inclusion of property not taxable under Cali-
fornia law. San Bernardino County v. Southern Pac. Ry., 118 U.S. 417 (1886); Santa Clara
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general scheme of property taxation allowed the taxable value of
property to be reduced by the amount of any mortgage on the
property. However, an exception was made for the property of rail-
road corporations which were not permitted any mortgage deduc-
tion. The purpose of the exception was found in the fact that most
railroads were mortgaged "for at least all they were worth.
' '12
7
Since the mortgagees were not taxed on their interests and since,
in any event, the creditors of the railroads (including the United
States) were largely outside the taxable jurisdiction of the state,
the railroad property would otherwise escape taxation altogether.
Since the state applied unequal valuation methods to railroads, on
the one hand, and all other property owners on the other, the rail-
roads claimed a violation of the equal protection clause. Justice
Field considered the validity of this classification in two circuit
court opinions, one in September, 1882, one in September, 1883.
These cases, therefore, preceded the Field opinions for the Su-
preme Court in Barbier v. Connolly and Soon Hing v. Crowley, but
they revealed that the model of unjustifiable classifications was al-
ready well developed in Field's mind. In particular, they show that
he probably considered racial discrimination to be objectionable
only insofar as it was a case of unjustifiable classification. 128
As with the dissents in the Slaughter-House Cases, Field's
opinions stressed the universality of the protection ensured by the
fourteenth amendment, denying that it was exclusively for the
benefit of racial minorities. He acknowledged the historical impe-
tus for the amendment was a reaction to racial discrimination but
claimed this problem had stirred the framers to deal with the more
general problem of unequal law.129 Racial classifications, however,
did provide the prototype for invalid discrimination being based
solely on the difference in the people affected and not on any other
state purpose. Thus he conceded that property might be classified
County v. Southern Pac. Ry., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). The Santa Clara case is best known for
the Court's conclusory dictum that corporations were to be considered persons for the pur-
poses of fourteenth amendment adjudication. See generally H. GRAHAM, supra note 109, at
30-97.
127. C. SWISHER, supra note 87, at 251. The background for these cases is described in
H. GRAHAM, supra note 109, at 397-99.
128. To the extent the more limited version of equal protection found in the Slaughter-
House Cases was controlling law, Field's opinions in these cases were of questionable propri-
ety. See H. GRAHAM, supra note 109, at 148-49, 392, 576.
129. 13 F. at 738-40; 18 F. at 397-98.
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for the purposes of taxation and different classes of property might
be taxed at different rates. Such classification would serve the pub-
lic interest in either encouraging or discouraging certain activities
or the public interest in equitable taxation itself, by recognizing
the inherent difference in value or utility of different kinds of
property. 130 But classification of property, which was permissible,
was to be distinguished from classification of and discrimination
among property owners. In the case at hand, the only distinguish-
ing criterion for the two methods of assessment was the character
of the property owner. Field acknowledged the unusual debt status
of the railroad companies but declared that, like any other per-
sonal characteristics, this could not be relied on by the state for
differing treatment. Discrimination against different kinds of per-
sons, as such, was no different than racial discrimination. A para-
graph from one of the opinions makes the point plainly:
Strangely, indeed, would the law sound in case it read that in the assessment
and taxation of property a deduction should be made for mortgages thereon
if the property be owned by white men or by old men, and not deducted if
owned by black men or by young men; deducted if owned by landsmen, not
deducted if owned by sailors; deducted if owned by married men, not de-
ducted if owned by bachelors; deducted if owned by men doing business
alone, not deducted if owned by men doing business in partnerships or other
associations; deducted if owned by trading corporations, not deducted if
owned by churches or universities; and so on, making a discrimination when-
ever there was any difference in the character or pursuit or condition of the
owner. To levy taxes upon a valuation of property thus made is of the very
essence of tyranny, and has never been done except by bad governments in
evil times, exercising arbitrary and despotic power."'
The model of unjustifiable classifications distinguishes between
those classifications that serve as a permissible governmental end
and those that serve only inequality itself. Racial discrimination is
condemned because it is deemed to have no purpose other than
mere subjugation of a disfavored class. Justice Field in the quoted
language essentially equated the characteristics of race and busi-
ness organization.13 2 He extended the idea that race distinctions do
130. Id. at 737-38; 18 F. at 407-09.
131. 18 F. at 396.
132. The association in Field's equal protection discussions of discrimination against
Chinese and discrimination against business corporations presents some interesting parallels
with the two most significant political issues in California in the middle of the nineteenth
century, a period in which Field's political and legal views matured. In the public discourses
at the time, the Chinese, who worked for low wages, and the corporations were seen as part
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not serve as a proper governmental objection to personal qualities
in general. 1as Of course, by this analogy Field proved too much.
Legislative distinctions serve public purposes only because of some
difference in the character of the person affected. Every classifica-
tion can reasonably be characterized as depending on personal
qualities. The differing rates for different kinds of property, that
Field approved, may as aptly be described as classifications among
taxpayers owning real property and taxpayers owning personal
property. A legitimate state interest is deemed served by ex-
tracting more from one class than from another. It is certainly
hard to see anything inherently less odious about this distinction
than about that between "men doing business alone" and "men
doing business in partnerships or other associations." Considera-
tions of public policy or tax equity may persuade that some dis-
tinctions ought to be drawn and others not. But there is no ab-
stract category of "mere personal discrimination" that may, a pri-
ori, be labeled as unrelated to legitimate governmental concerns,
and consequently a condemnation of all classifications based on
such qualities cannot substitute for an examination of the justifica-
tion for the discrimination.1 34 For California, the considerations of
tax equity demanded disparate assessment for owners of heavily
mortgaged property, a group roughly approximated by railroad
corporations."'_
of a single conspiracy against the workingman. One commentator has noted that "[s]ince the
Chinese were employed by most of the corporations, whether engaged in transportation, in
manufacturing, or in land development, they were opposed not merely as competitors for
employment, but also as tools of the capitalists in their efforts to control the economic and
political life of the state." C. SANDMEYER, supra note 87, at 67. Thus radical politics and
racial hostility were united in such movements as the Workingmen's Party led by Dennis
Kearney. That party was the major influence in the drafting of the State Constitution of
1879 which had as its special targets the Chinese and the corporations with particular hostil-
ity reserved for railroad corporations. See id. at 67-74; Sandmeyer, supra note 87, at 200; L.
CHIN, supra note 87, at 25. See also H. GRAHAM, supra note 109, at 14-15, 397.
133. The idea that it is hostility to persons as such that makes for unconstitutionality
is an unrelenting theme in the model of unjustifiable classifications. See, e.g., the language
from Yick Wo v. Hopkins quoted at text accompanying note 105 supra.
134. Thus a per se condemnation of racial classifications is basically inconsistent with
this model of equal protection adjudication. See text accompanying notes 179-202 infra. Of
course it is just this refusal to stop the inquiry at any superficial characteristics of the classi-
fication challenged that distinguished this model from that of impermissible classifications.
135. Field's objection did not seem to be one of insufficient "fit" between railroad cor-
porations and the target class of highly mortgaged property. 13 F. at 735-38; 18 F. at 392-95,
704 [Vol. 29
EQUAL PROTECTION
This analysis enables us to see more clearly the inevitable re-
sult of the use of the model of unjustifiable classifications. To de-
clare a classification unconstitutional under that model requires a
finding that the classification did not sufficiently serve a legitimate
police power objective. If taken seriously, no easy definitional ap-
proach could take the place of an honest inquiry into the value of
the classification as an instrument of public policy. The rejection
of the model of impermissible classifications and the flaws in
Field's analysis in the railroad tax cases make this clear. Having
embraced the criterion of public utility there could be no turning
back from a review of the wisdom of challenged classifications. As
long as this model remained at the bottom of the Court's under-
standing of its job, more restricted techniques of adjudication
would necessarily have to give way.
VII. VARIATIONS ON THE MODEL OF UNJUSTIFIABLE
CLASSIFICATIONS
It now remains only to survey the application of the model of
unjustifiable classifications to cases brought before the Supreme
Court during the rest of the period under study. We will be able to
note, in particular, other efforts to restate or to translate the ele-
ments of that model into formulas for testing constitutionality
which looked less obviously like a reexamination of the intelligence
and general propriety of challenged legislation. While these efforts
may have stemmed from the Court's reluctance to engage in un-
abashed second guessing of the legislature, there remained an even
greater reluctance to abandon the model itself. That being so, the
Court could never embrace a formula of equal protection adjudica-
tion that precluded a case-by-case investigation of the public pur-
pose which a classification served and the aptness of the classifica-
tion in achieving it.
These attempts to refine the model, however, did not develop
until late in the period under discussion. Although the model of
unjustifiable classifications was well established by the time of the
Yick Wo case in 1886, the Court made sparing use of it until the
last years of the century. It then began to strike down with in-
creasing regularity what it viewed as inappropriate social and eco-




We will first consider applications of the model of unjustifiable
classification which focused on the novelty or experimental nature
of the legislation under attack. Given the model's premise that un-
equal classification was appropriate in carrying out the ordinary
and necessary functions of government5 7 and invalid otherwise, it
is not surprising that the Court's decisions began to examine more
seriously new forms of government regulations where such regula-
tions resulted in unequal treatment. This approach is illustrated
by the Court's discussion in an 1890 challenge to a state scheme of
taxation which assessed corporate bonds at their nominal or par
value while other obligations were assessed at their actual value.138
The Court upheld the classification, noting, as Field had in the
California railroad tax cases, that states had traditionally taxed
different trades, professions or kinds of property at different
rates. 13 Citing Field's opinion in Barbier v. Connolly, the Court
reiterated the right of a state to discriminate to further the general
welfare by using classifications "which every State, in one form or
another, deems it expedient to adopt.' 140 But in making its inquiry
into the extent to which tax classifications were within the state's
power, the Court evinced an intention to be guided by what states
had traditionally applied as "general usage." "[C]lear and hostile
discriminations against particular persons and classes, especially
136. In Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890), the Court invali-
dated a scheme of railroad rate regulation principally on the ground that it deprived the
railroad of liberty and property without due process of law. In an extremely summary dis-
cussion, Justice Blatchford's decision also concluded that disallowing a reasonable return to
railroads while allowing it to other businesses constituted a denial of the equal protection of
the laws. Id. at 458. With this exception the Court does not appear to have based a holding
of unconstitutionality on the equal protection clause from Yick Wo in 1886 until Gulf, Colo.
& S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897), discussed at text accompanying notes 151-56 infra.
Commentators have noted that also with respect to substantive due process adjudication the
Court did not become significantly "activist" until the 1890's. See C. HAINES, supra note 46,
at 198-99; M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA 366-70 (1977); Gaffney, History and Legal Interpretation: The Early Distortion of
the Fourteenth Amendment by the Gilded Age Court, 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 207, 225-28
(1976).
137. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896) (The state "is at liberty to
act with reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with
a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good
order.").
138. Bell's Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1890).
139. Id. at 237. Justice Field joined the opinion of the Court by Justice Bradley.
140. Id. at 237-38.
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such as are of an unusual character, unknown to the practice of our
governments, might be obnoxious to the constitutional
prohibition.
141
The same strain was apparent in a 1900 case, upholding the
exemption for planters and farmers from a tax on the refining of
sugar and molasses. Invoking the usual police power inquiry, Jus-
tice Brewer's opinion distinguished between classifications like the
one under scrutiny, "founded upon a reasonable distinction," and
those based upon "considerations having no possible connection
with the duties of citizens as taxpayers," and that were, therefore,
"pure favoritism.' 1 42 The discrimination challenged was "obviously
intended as an encouragement to agriculture," but it was not "pure
favoritism" because "from time out of mind it has been the policy
of this government, not only to classify for the purposes of taxa-
tion, but to exempt producers from the taxation of the methods
employed by them to put their products upon the market.'1 43
Moreover, federal statutes had granted similar exemptions since
1813. This history showed "that the discrimination [was] based on
reasonable grounds."14. But this was not to say that every kind of
processing of farm produce by farmers could constitutionally be
exempted from a general tax on such processing. It was common
practice for farmers to grind and refine their own sugar and molas-
ses. But a "somewhat different question might arise" if they were
to work their sugar into "confectionary, preserves or pastry," be-
cause once mixed with other ingredients they were not "the natu-
ral products of the farm.' 45 Since the latter hypothetical exemp-
tion would equally aid agriculture, the determining factor seems to
be the familiarity of mere refining and the time sanctioned recog-
nition of it by the government. In contrast, an exemption of pastry
making from taxes would present a discrimination "of an unusual
141. Id.
142. American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92 (1900). The discussion
also contains further evidence of the assimilation of the objection to racial discrimination
within the model of unjustifiable classifications. Classifications based on such factors as
"differences of color, race, nativity, religious opinions [and] political affiliations," id., are
cited as denials of equal protection not because they are somehow automatically offensive
but because they are "arbitrary, oppressive or capricious. . . having no possible connection
with the duties of citizens as taxpayers." Id.
143. Id. at 92, 95.
144. Id. at 93.
145. Id. at 92.
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character, unknown to the practice of our governments."'""
The favored treatment of traditional practice is not unex-
pected given the elements of the model of unjustifiable classifica-
tions. It is natural to assume that one would identify reasonable
measures to appropriate governmental ends by reference to the
traditional, familiar, and ordinary working processes of govern-
ment. Any classification departing from these processes was sus-
pect as something other than the incidental fallout of government
at work, that is as pure favoritism. On this view, of course, any
novelty was in trouble. This understanding was bound to conflict
with the changing view of the proper role of government reflected
in the increasing volume of social and economic regulation by the
states during one of the most creative legislative periods in Ameri-
can history. Rate regulation, health, safety, and wage and hour
laws, antitrust and workers' compensation were only a few of the
fields in which legislatures were becoming involved. 14 7 Such legisla-
tive experiments were plainly in jeopardy unless the Court could
assimilate them to some established category of police power
legislation.
But it was precisely the ready power to describe novel legisla-
tion in traditional terms which made this particular technique for
applying the model no more restrictive than the model simpliciter.
The hypothetically unconstitutional tax exemption in the sugar re-
fining case was put in terms of one for making "confectionary, pre-
serves or pastry," and, as such, was an unheard of government sub-
sidy. But if the favored activity were put in such terms as
"preparation of farm produce for the market" it could easily be
understood as within the traditional governmental activity of pro-
moting agricultural production. So while new kinds of government
regulation were vulnerable to this kind of adjudication, they were,
by no means, foredoomed. Rather, the Court was free to style the
classification as an unexceptional goverment activity or as an inno-
vative discrimination. The judges' perceptions of the proper role of
goverment, developed from sources outside of positive constitu-
tional law, undoubtedly affected the light in which the classifica-
tion appeared.
A similar difficulty beset a second way of applying the model
146. 134 U.S. at 237.
147. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 384-445 (1973).
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of unjustifiable classifications. This is the concept first clearly de-
scribed by Tussman and ten Broek and often referred to as the
aptness of the classificatory "fit". 48 In order for discriminatory
legislation to serve a public purpose it must be true that there are
differences in the groups that the law regulates which call for cor-
respondingly different kinds of state treatment in order to achieve
the state's goal. But since precise identification of individuals qual-
ifying for particular kinds of treatment is ordinarily impossible as
an administrative matter, the state substitues for the true "target"
group another group more easily ascertainable. As these two
groups diverge, the posited public purpose is less well served and
the classification is less easily justifiable.'49 But as with the identi-
fication of novel or traditional state functions, the terms of
description adopted will be critical. The more precise the Court is
in specifying the law's purpose, that is in defining the true "target"
group, the less likely it is a neat fit will be apparent. The same will
be true as the Court concentrates on the borderline cases of the
substitute group defined by the legislature rather than on its core
characteristics. Given such characterizations the classifications will
look like mere rank discrimination unredeemed by a police power
justification. 50
Consider, for example, the Court's decisions in two cases gov-
erning the imposition of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees on railroad cor-
porations in civil actions brought against them. In Gulf, Colorado
& Santa Fe Railway v. Ellis, 5' the railroad successfully contested
the validity of a Texas statute which made losing railroad defen-
148. See Tussman & ten Broek, supra note 17, at 347.
149. Id.
150. See Note, supra note 69,. at 126-40. The author suggests that any classification
may be deemed rationally related to a public purpose by defining the public purpose in
terms of the different treatment imposed. One need never concede that a statute exists
merely to favor one group over another since there will always be some permissible goal
which can be attached to any conceivable statute. Similarly any classification may be found
invalid by using one of three methods: "(A) ignoring a purpose, (B) stating the purpose as a
unit rather than as a mix of policies, and (C) manipulating the level of abstraction at which
the purpose is defined." Id. at 132. See I. BERLIN, supra note 17, at 82-83:
To state the principle in this way leaves open crucial issues; thus it may be justly
objected that unless some specific sense is given to 'sufficient reason' the princi-
ple can be reduced to a trivial tautology (It is reasonable to act in manner X
save in circumstances Y, in which it is not rational, and any circumstances may
be Y.).
151. 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
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dants liable for limited attorneys' fees in actions in which fifty dol-
lars or less was at issue. The opinion for the Court by Justice
Brewer found the statute created two classes of losing defendants,
one consisting solely of railroad corporations. 152 In another light,
the Court regarded the statute as working a discrimination be-
tween the railroad defendants and the plaintiffs in actions against
railroads. 153 After restating the elements of the model of unjustifi-
able classifications, the opinion went on to state that the proper
inquiry in this case was whether there was "some reason why the
duty of payment is more imperative in the one instance than in the
other."' 4 Justice Brewer then examined a catalogue of possible
reasons for the unequal treatment, but found each one inade-
quately served. The burden imposed could not be justified on ac-
count of the special corporate privileges allowed since only railroad
corporations were affected. It could not be approved on the basis
of the special duties of common carriers, because other such forms
of transportation were omitted. Nor was it needed to protect less
powerful litigants because the fees would be awarded to any plain-
tiff, rich or poor. It could not be allowed as a safety measure since
the statute applied to claims of all kinds against railroads, not
merely those involving operations of special danger. Therefore, the
Court was left not with a reasonably functional legislative classifi-
cation but rather with mere "arbitrary selection."' 5 The Court de-
fined certain narrow and isolated police power goals and measured
the specific attributes of the classification against them. This tech-
nique, not surprisingly, proved fatal.'
In contrast. is the Court's decision in Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe R.R. v. Matthews, 5 7 decided two years later in another
opinion by Justice Brewer. 5 8 The railroad challenged a Kansas
152. Id. at 153.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 157.
155. Id. at 157-59.
156. In comparison, the dissenting opinion by Justice Gray, joined by Chief Justice
Fuller and Justice White, dealt far less specifically with "little questions of costs." Rather,
Justice Gray was content to note the traditional power of states to regulate costs in judicial
proceedings and that states had a right to employ that power to discourage stalling by a
group of defendants who, the legislature may have concluded from experience, was prone to
such tactics. Id. at 166-68. The majority opinion's manipulation of the definition of the pub-
lic purpose served is discussed in Note, supra note 69, at 133-37.
157. 174 U.S. 96 (1899).
158. This time Justice Brewer was joined by Justices White and Gray and Chief Justice
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statute which imposed plaintiffs' attorneys' fees on unsuccessful
railroad defendants in actions for damages from fires caused by
railroad operations. This time the Court upheld the statute. The
Court conceded that an inequality between railroad corporations
and other litigants had been created. But in Matthews, unlike El-
lis, the inequality was reasonably related to a proper police power
objective inasmuch as it provided some incentives for railroads to
exercise a heightened degree of caution and thus minimize the inci-
dence of fires. Noting the special risk of destructive prairie fires
from sparks escaping from moving trains, the Court found the spe-
cial burden on railroads a reasonable regulation. 159 This conclusion,
of course, could not withstand the kind of analysis to which Justice
Brewer had submitted the Texas statute in Ellis. For example, it
could be argued that a bona fide fire prevention measure would
extend to all defendants in actions for recovery of fire damage, not
just to railroads.160
The comparison of Ellis and Matthews illustrates the mallea-
bility of judicial examination of the aptness of legislative classifica-
tion in accomplishing state purposes and, in particular, the unreli-
ability of the concept of "fit", without more, as a consistent way of
applying the model of unjustifiable classifications. In Matthews,
Fuller, who had dissented in Ellis, as well as Justice Shiras, who had been in the Ellis
majority. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Brown and Peckham, all of whom had joined
Brewer's majority opinion in Ellis, dissented. They were joined in dissent by Justice Mc-
Kenna who had been appointed in the interim. It may be of some significance that in the
same intervening period Justice Field had retired. Brewer was not only'Field's nephew but,
in many ways, his intellectual protege, as well. See C. FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND
THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890 389 (1939); L. PFEFFER, THIS HONORABLE COURT, A HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 208 (1965); Paul, David J. Brewer, in 2 THE JUSTICES
OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, 1515 (L. Friedman & F. Israel, eds. 1969).
But see J. SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS TO A CHANGING
SociET 1890-1920, 244-45 (1978). A double damages provision for livestock injured by rail-
roads that had refused to fence had been upheld by the Court in Missouri Pac. Ry. v.
Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885), in a unanimous opinion by Justice Field.
159. 174 U.S. at 101-02.
160. Justice Brewer's assertion that "[n]o other work done, or industry carried on, car-
ries with it so much of danger from escaping fire," id. at 102, was not self evident. But even
accepting this, one could question why the statute by its terms applied to fires created by
any railroad operations and not merely those from the special danger of locomotives speed-
ing through the prairies. Later cases would find this kind of lack of fit-over-inclusive-
ness-permissible in that the state could reasonably adopt broad prophylactic measures and
need not draw classifications with mathematical precision. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retire-




Justice Brewer was content to state an obvious connection between
the group affected and the evil to be eradicated without asking the
nitpicking questions which might have been put. In Ellis, his opin-
ion was nothing but a series of such questions. This is not to say
that the "fit" was not, indeed, better in Matthews than in Ellis. It
is only to question why the line of constitutional and unconstitu-
tional inequality should have been drawn between them. It is ex-
actly upon such distinctions that this view of the model of unjusti-
fiable classifications is based, but in the drawing of which it can
provide no guidance.""' In fact, Justice Brewer seemed acutely
aware of this difficulty in Matthews:
It is easy to distinguish between the full light of day and the darkness of
midnight, but often very difficult to determine whether a given moment in
the twilight hour is before or after that in which the light predominates over
the darkness ....
Is the classification or discrimination prescribed thereby purely arbitrary or
has it some basis in that which has a reasonable relation to the object sought
to be accomplished? It is not at all to be wondered at that as these doubtful
cases come before this court the justices have often divided in opinion...
but the division in all of them was, not upon the principle or rule of separa-
tion, but upon the location of the particular case one side or the other of the
dividing line.
162
The point is not that Ellis and Matthews were inconsistent.
They were not. They were both properly explicable as products of
the technique of equal protection adjudication under discussion.
But decisions that both statutes were constitutional, or both were
unconstitutional (even perhaps that the Ellis statute was valid and
the Matthews statute invalid), would also have been consistent ap-
plications of this method. As was the case with Justice Field's con-
demnation in the railroad tax cases of discriminations based on
personal characteristics and with attempts to isolate unusual or
novel classifications, judging classifications according to "fit" did
not satisfy the need for a limit on judicial discretion that was put
forward at the outset.
All of these formulations of the model of unjustifiable classifi-
cations were incomplete as modes of decision. They permitted dif-
ferent, even inconsistent results. So in choosing a result the court
161. See Note, supra note 69, at 124 n.11 ("Thiere seems to be an axiom to fit any
degree of accuracy the courts might wish to require.").
162. 174 U.S. at 103, 105-06.
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had to look elsewhere. 13 But the true sources of decision were not
deduced either from the Constitution or the devices of adjudica-
tion that the Court had developed. They were almost never articu-
lated. It cannot be surprising if, as is commonly assumed, the Jus-
tices turned consciously or instinctively to the economic and social
philosophies dominant among men of their background and class
at that time8 4 or, since these philosophies themselves were far
from determinate, that their decisions yielded no discernable pat-
tern of adjudication.
The potential which such techniques of adjudication had for
the incorporation of extra-constitutional bases of decision was un-
usually obvious in another opinion by Justice Brewer." 5 The deci-
sion invalidated Kansas' regulation of the rates charged by stock-
yards. The Justice's economic biases were particularly apparent.
The statute applied only to stockyards dealing with an average
daily volume of 100 or more head of cattle or 300 or more head of
hogs or sheep. Justice Brewer's opinion first condemned the rates
allowed as confiscation and therefore a deprivation without due
process.166 But he found the restriction on rates according to size
also a violation of equal protection. Although the size limit insured
163. Cf. H. HART, supra note 25, at 154-63.
164. See, for example, the well-known remarks of Justice Miller in a letter written De-
cember 5, 1875:
It is vain to contend with judges who have been at the bar the advocates for
forty years of railroad companies, and all the forms of associated capital, when
they are called upon to decide cases where such interests are in contest. All their
training, all their feelings are from the start in favor of those who need no such
influence.
Quoied in C. FAIRMAN, supra note 158, at 374. See C. HAiNms, supra note 46, at 180; J.
SEMONCHE, supra note 158, at 95, 133; Mendelson, Mr. Justice Field and Laissez Faire, 36
VA. L. REv. 45 (1950). But see McCurdy, supra note 77, at 973, which argues that, at least
with respect to Field, his opinions follow a coherent vision of the proper spheres of public
and private power. See generally M. KELLER, supra note 136, at 369-70.
165. Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards, 183 U.S. 79 (1901). Justice Brewer's opinion
was, however, only joined by two other justices. The extent to which the opinion reflects the
views of the other Justices is not clear. Justice Harlan spoke for six Justices in noting, in a
brief statement, that the statute was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because
it applied, in fact, only to the Kansas City Stock Yards. He explicitly refused to express any
views on whether the statute was a deprivation of property without due process of law. Id.
at 114-15. This leaves in doubt the extent to which these Justices agreed with the broader
equal protection discussion in Justice Brewer's opinion. Professor Semonche suggests that
the division was a result of Justice Brewer's exceeding the mandate given him in conference
by expanding into the due process question and that the equal protection point was rela-
tively uncontroversial. See J. SEMONCHE, supra note 158, at 145-46.
166. See note 165 supra.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
that the regulation would operate only on the Kansas City Stock-
yard, ' 7 Justice Brewer found it wanting on broader equal protec-
tion grounds. He asked whether the state could justify a discrimi-
nation "between stockyards doing a large and those doing a small
business.' 6 8 The state claimed large volume stockyards raised a
threat of monopolistic pricing and that the large volume allowed
profitable operation at lower rates. Justice Brewer acknowledged
that such considerations might justify a classification based on the
"character or value of the services rendered," but not one based
"simply on the amount of the business which the party does."'""
He then proceeded to parse the classification with the kind of pre-
cision he had utilized in Ellis:
There can be no pretence that a stockyard which receives 99 head of cattle
per day a year is not doing precisely the same business as one receiving 101
head of cattle per day each year. It is the same business in all its essential
elements, and the only difference is that one does more business than the
other .... If such legislation does not deny the equal protection of the laws,
we are unable to perceive what legislation would.
170
Again the critical feature of the analysis is the specificity with
which the classification and the asserted end are examined in de-
ciding whether the discrimination is an apt means to the state goal.
Justice Brewer did not stick to a discussion of "large volume" and
"small volume" stockyards between which a difference in treat-
ment would seem reasonable in light of the state interest claimed.
Rather he compared stockyards handling 99 head per day with
those handling 101 head per day. That comparison made the dis-
tinction look outrageous. This result was reached although the for-
mer classification necessarily included the latter.'7, With the judi-
167. This was the sole ground relied on by the other six Justices. See note 165 supra.
168. 183 U.S. at 103.
169. Id. at 104.
170. Id. at 112.
171. Compare this opinion with that of the Court in Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav.
Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898), in which a challenge was raised to the Illinois inheritance tax. A
similar way of looking at the classification involved was urged on the Court since different
tax rates were imposed according to the value of the estate. It was argued that to tax only a
3% tax on a $10,000 legacy and 4% tax on $10,001 legacy was indefensible. But in Magoun
the classification was held valid, with the Court rejecting the claim that the mere specifica-
tion of dollar amounts was enough to invalidate it. Accord, Clark v. Titusville, 184 U.S. 329
(1902). Justice Brewer dissented in Magoun (but not in Clark), finding the statute "unequal
because based upon a classification purely arbitrary, to wit, that of wealth-a tax directly
and intentionally made unequal." 170 U.S. at 303.
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cial eye focused on such narrow differences, no state end would
appear well served by a classification.
Justice Brewer's opinion is remarkable for the candor with
which it revealed the reasons for his hostility toward the legisla-
tion, i.e., the reasons why he found it unjustifiable.
The question thus presented is of profoundest significance. Is it true in this
country that one who by his attention to business, by his efforts to satisfy
customers, by his sagacity in discerning the probable courses of trade and by
contributing of his means to bring trade into those lines, succeeds in building
up a large and profitable business, becomes thereby a legitimate object of the
legislative scalping knife? Having created the facilities which the many enjoy,
can the many turn around and say, you are making too much out of those
facilities, and you must divide with us your profits.?
17 2
Neither the idea of traditional practice nor the concept of
"fit," both so vulnerable to judicial manipulation of the terms
describing the classification, could avoid the basic problem with
the model of unjustifiable classifications. That problem was the
need to review the suitability of classifications to the work of gov-
ernment with no external a priori guidelines as to what that work
properly was or what in any case was a reasonable pursuit of it.
We have thus reached the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury, a period in which the doctrine of economic substantive due
process is generally thought to have reached its ascendancy.17 The
same may be said of the doctrine of unjustifiable classifications in
equal protection adjudication. Both doctrines were apt vehicles for
the judicial imposition of substantive policy criteria on legislative
determinations. We may look at one further example, Connolly v.
Union Sewer Pipe,74 decided on March 10, 1902. In that case, we
see the result of the model of unjustifiable classifications and the
difficulties noted in extracting principled decisions from that
model. There the validity of an Illinois statute, making combina-
tions in restraint of trade unlawful, was put in issue. In particular,
the Court was asked to consider the statute's exemptions for trade
in "argicultural products or live stock while in the hands of the
producer or raiser.' 17 The Court held the law unconstitutional in
172. 183 U.S. at 104-05.
173. See C. HAINES, supra note 46, at 182-85; see generally A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRI-
SIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATrITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH 1887-1895 (1976).
174. 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
175. Id. at 554.
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an opinion by Justice Harlan. The opinion is significant in its fail-
ure to articulate any reasoned basis for the decision within the
model of unjustifiable classifications. Given the classification at is-
sue and its resemblance to those dealt with in earlier precedent,
none of the techniques discussed, analytical or rhetorical, could do
the job the Court wanted done. The classification was not (nor
could it have been)176 labelled an "unusual" discrimination. Nor
could the Court complain about the classification's lack of "fit"
with a state purpose. The Court did not even consider and reject
the claimed state justifications for the exemption. Instead, Justice
Harlan's opinion is a pastiche of quotations from the Court's equal
protection cases denouncing unequal and arbitrary state regulation
and setting out, in its most general terms, the model of unjustifi-
able classifications and finally concluding that the statute "is so
manifestly a denial of the equal protection of the laws that further
or extended argument to establish that position would seem to be
unnecessary." 77 No restricting rule, not even the elastic standards
discussed, was sufficient to serve a Court apparently bent on case-
by-case adjudication." 8 The model of unjustifiable classifications
thus reverted to its most general, and therefore least restrictive,
form and the inclusion or exclusion of particular legislative dis-
criminations was reduced to an exercise in ipse dixit.
176. This was especially true in light of the American Sugar Refining case discussed at
text accompanying notes 142-46 supra, in which the Court upheld an exemption for farmers
from the tax on sugar and molasses refining as an appropriate encouragement to agriculture.
Justice Harlan attempted to distinguish that case and the Magoun case discussed in note
163 supra as follows:
It is one thing to exert the power of taxation so as to meet the expenses of
government, and at the same time, indirectly, to build up or protect particular
interests or industries. It is quite a different thing for the State, under its gen-
eral police power, to enter the domain of trade or commerce, and discriminate
against some by declaring that particular classes within its jurisdiction shall be
exempt from the operation of a general statute making it criminal to do certain
things connected with domestic trade or commerce. Such a statute is not a legiti-
mate exertion of the power of classification, rests upon no reasonable basis, is
purely arbitrary, and plainly denies the equal protection of the laws to those
against whom it discriminates.
184 U.S. at 563. This style of argument pervades the opinion.
177. Id. at 564.
178. See J. SEMONCHE, supra note 158, at 95 ("[T]he activist court of the 1890s was
attracted to the formulation of a general rule, the application of which it would judge anew




By the turn of the century, the triumph of the model of unjus-
tifiable classifications for equal protection analysis was complete.
Perhaps no feature of constitutional adjudication of the period il-
lustrates its ascendancy more than the Court's altered treatment of
state discrimination on the basis of race. Such classification, of
course, provided the paradigm for the model of impermissible clas-
sifications, inferred from the majority opinion in the Slaughter-
House Cases. On that view, discrimination against blacks on ac-
count of race would be invalid without regard to the utility of the
classification as judged by the Court. Such a model might have
provided a far more limited field of judicial action under the equal
protection clause. The Court did not extend that model outside the
area of race to strike down or uphold any challenged classification.
Moreover, even with respect to racial discrimination, two cases de-
cided in this period seem to demonstrate that racial classifications,
as well, would be subject to the more flexible model of unjustifiable
classifications.
The better known case is Plessy v. Ferguson1' decided in
1896, upholding Louisiana's statutory policy of separate cars on
the state's railroads for black and white. Plessy may be understood
in one of two ways, the first of which only marginally implicates
the problems under discussion. That is the contention that the pol-
icy of forced separation involved no inequality at all and that the
equal protection clause was therefore entirely inapplicable. s0 The
opinion contained language to this effect, including the frequently
quoted conclusion that any stamp of inferiority connected with the
statute existed "solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it."'' However, perhaps conscious of the insub-
stantiality of this claim, this position was not a major theme in the
opinion. As the dissenting opinion made clear, the system of segre-
gation was a component of a racial caste system in which blacks
were plainly relegated to a position of inferiority."8 2 Instead, the
179. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
180. This was the holding with respect to the claim of racial discrimination in Pace v.
Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882), decided much earlier in this period in which the Court up-
held a statute providing more severe penalties for interracial fornication or adultery than for
the same crimes committed between people of the same race.
181. 163 U.S. at 551.
182. Every one knows that the statute in question had its origins in the purpose,
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majority opinion at times seemed to acknowledge the inequality of
the scheme of laws of which the statute was a part, but denied that
such inequality was proscribed by the fourteenth amendment. 183
And, in a now familiar way, it went on to conclude that such legis-
lation was a well-established and proper exercise of the state's po-
lice power.
The Court rejected the claim that, if this statute were valid, it
would signify that other laws of separation would necessarily be
valid, such as one requiring separate cars for persons with different
hair colors or for citizens and aliens.'" Nor did the validity of this
law say anything for the constitutionality of laws
requiring colored people to walk upon one side of the street, and white people
upon the other, or requiring white men's houses to be painted white, and
colored men's black, or their vehicles or business signs to be of different col-
ors, upon the theory that one side of the street is as good as the other, or that
a house or vehicle of one color is as good as one of another color. 86
If the Court's approval of the law in Plessy were merely on the
ground that it created no inequality, the hypothetical regulations
would be indistinguishable. But the Court apparently felt that
those regulations, as well as the one in the case before it, presented
sufficient questions of inequality to subject them to the same in-
quiry to which unequal classifications were generally subjected.
The Court's differentiation of the Louisiana statute from the
hypothetical laws described in the quoted language was in terms of
the model of unjustifiable classifications:
The reply to all this is that every exercise of the police power must be reason-
able, and extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for the promo-
tion for the public good, and not for the annoyance or oppression of a partic-
ular class ....
not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as
to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white per-
sons.... No one would be so wanting in candor as to assert the contrary.
163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the 19th century legal develop-
ments evidencing a recognition that racially segregated transportation entailed unequal
treatment, see Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of
Laws," 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 421, 452-56.
183. 163 U.S. at 549-51. The case might also be understood as admitting the inequality
but attributing it entirely to nongovernmental sources, thus putting it beyond constitutional
attack under the rule of The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).




So far, then, as a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned,
the case reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a
reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there must necessarily be a
large discretion on the part of the legislature. In determining the question of
reasonableness it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages,
customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of
their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order.18 6
To the extent the Court was proceeding on the assumption
that segregation did present a case of discrimination, the question
reduced itself to the now familiar investigation of the utility of the
law in effecting proper government functions. No stricter inquiry
was called for merely because the disadvantaged group was a racial
one. The case had been argued primarily in terms of the propriety
of segregation as a police power measure.187 One brief contended
that the proper governmental nature of the law was evidenced by
the fact that the regulation did not apply to urban street railways
since those lines "are only possible in thickly populated centres,
where the white and colored races are numerically in a ratio of
equality, enjoy a more advanced civilization, and where the danger
of friction from too intimate contact is much less than it is in the
rural and sparsely settled districts."18 Indeed the Court explicitly
relied on a finding that the classification was calculated to promote
the "public peace and good order.""8 ' The majority opinion cited
Yick Wo not as a lesson in the proper way to treat racial discrimi-
nation, but as a case in which a classification was invalid because it
bore no relation to the "competency" or "propriety" of the penal-
ized group carrying on the forbidden laundry business.1 90 Racial
classifications were-like classifications in general-invalid when
they failed to be justified as appropriate governmental measures,
otherwise valid.191
186. Id. at 550.
187. Brief for Plaintiff in Error (by S.F. Phillips & F.D. McKenney) at 10-11; Brief for
Plaintiff in Error (by James C. Walker, of counsel) at 14-19; Brief for Defendant in Error
(by Alexander Porter Morse, of counsel) at 4-9.
188. Brief for Defendant in Error (by Alexander Porter Morse, of counsel) at 5. See J.
SEMONCHE, supra note 158, at 83-84.
189. 163 U.S. at 550. The reference to the established practices of the community also
reflects the variation of the model of unjustifiable classifications favoring familiar and cus-
tomary regulation. See text accompanying notes 137-47 supra.
190. 163 U.S. at 550.
191. This often overlooked aspect of the opinion has been recently noted in an opinion
of Justice Stewart. Fullilove v. Klutznick, - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980)(dissenting
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The well known dissent of Justice Harlan is in stark contrast.
His denial that any legislation may validly have reference to the
race of those it governs, is an almost classic statement of the de-
funct model of impermissible classifications. 1 2 He rejected, explic-
itly, the notion that the Court could substitute its own evaluation
of the "reasonableness of the regulation challenged" for a simple
inquiry into the basis of the classification. He found such tech-
niques to be an infringement on the legislative power "a dangerous
tendency in these latter days.'"1 3 The use of race was, in his view,
sufficient to seal the fate of the challenged law.
The strictness with which Justice Harlan applied this test in
Plessy and his criticism, in his dissent, of the model of unjustifi-
able classifications makes his opinion for the Court in the second
case, Cumming v. County Board of Education,19 4 all the more re-
markable. A state statute charged the Richmond County, Georgia,
Board of Education with the responsibility of operating a system
of elementary schools in the county and empowered the Board, if it
so chose, to establish and levy taxes for the support of such high
schools as it judged "the interest and convenience of the people"
required.19 5 In 1876 the Board established a high school for white
girls and provided a subsidy to a denominational high school for
white boys. In 1880 it established a high school for black children
but abolished it in 1897, "ascertaining that it had not funds suffi-
cient to carry on the colored high school and at the same time af-
ford school privileges to some 400 colored children in the primary
schools."196 These 400 children apparently could not be accommo-
opinion).
192. 163 U.S. at 554-55. Justice Harlan's famous assertion that "[o]ur Constitution is
color-blind," id. at 559, appears to be adapted from one of the briefs. "Justice is pictured
blind and her daughter, the Law, ought at least to be color-blind." Brief for Plaintiff in
Error (by James C. Walker, of counsel) at 19.
193. 163 U.S. at 558.
194. 175 U.S. 528 (1899). An interesting and thorough review of the background of and
parties to this litigation is Kousser, Separate but not Equal: The Supreme Court's First
Decision on Racial Discrimination in Schools, 46 J. Soc. HIsT. 17 (1980). Justice Harlan's
aversion to the model of unjustifiable classifications in the dissent in Plessy is also in con-
trast to his enthusiastic application of it in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540
(1902), discussed at text accompanying notes 174-78 supra, and his dissent in Atchison, T.
& S.F.R.R. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 106 (1899), discussed at text accompanying notes 157-
60 supra.
195. 175 U.S. at 534.




dated in the existing black schools. Black parents and taxpayers
sued, charging that by providing public support only to the high
school education of white children the Board had worked a denial
of the equal protection of the laws. A trial court ordered the Board
to refrain from supporting any white high school until equal facili-
ties were provided for black children.1'7 But the Supreme Court of
Georgia reversed, and the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the decision. Justice Harlan's opinion was particularly obtuse in
failing to acknowledge that any racial inequality existed at all. 19
Instead he dwelled on the fact that the relief sought-an injunc-
tion against the funding of white high schools-would be of no
benefit to the black children. But it is very clear that Justice
Harlan was also impressed with what he understood to be the diffi-
cult choice which had faced the Board. That was to close the black
high school or to turn away black children "who were without an
opportunity in primary schools to learn the alphabet and to read
and write."199 He closed with the suggestion that the fourteenth
amendment should not override decisions governing education in
state maintained schools, since those decisions were "a matter be-
longing to the respective states, and any interference on the part of
the Federal authority with the mangement of such schools cannot
be justified except in the case of clear and unmistakable disregard
of rights secured by the supreme law of the land. ' 200 While the
language of "reasonableness" and references to the police power
were absent, the model of unjustifiable classifications seemed to be
the predominant influence in the decision. The decision certainly
did not apply the model of impermissible classifications as expli-
cated in Harlan's dissent in Plessy.
In placing the entire impact of its fiscal problems on black stu-
dents the Board was most assuredly not color blind.2 0 ' But the
197. The trial court's decision was actually based on a violation of the state enabling
act. The trial judge stressed, however, that any other construction of the act would mean
that it violated the equal protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. Tran-
script of Record at 35-37.
198. This was not because the argument had not been clearly made. See Brief for
Plaintiffs in Error at 12-15.
199. 175 U.S. at 544.
200. Id. at 545.
201. While not free of ambiguity, one of the county's briefs seems, at one point, to have
conceded the fact of inequality of the schools as well as revealing the racial biases of the
writer:
But it will be said the classification now in question is one based on color, and so
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mere use of racial criteria was not found sufficient to invalidate
otherwise proper managerial decisions by the Board. The Court
permitted the racial discrimination because it was applied in a rea-
sonable way for a proper governmental end.202
CONCLUSION
The model of unjustifiable classifications could provide no co-
herent and stable guide to the validity of state legislation involving
race or otherwise. Each attempt to reformulate it so as to yield
some more definite standard of adjudication ultimately failed. Fi-
nally the jurisprudence of equal protection was reduced to the
kinds of generalized harangues about the unfairness of legislation
exemplified by the opinion in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe.203
Such a model of decision naturally tended toward an incorporation
into fundamental law of the Justices' own views on the proper aims
and operation of government regulation.
It has been noted that the developments which have been
traced here paralleled similar changes in the Supreme Court's use
of the due process clause, a phenomenon better known and more
widely discussed.2 ' In each case, the Court was faced with an obvi-
ously important, but textually obscure constitutional provision. In
it is; but the color carries with it natural race peculiarities, which furnish the
reason for the classification. There are differences in races, and between individ-
uals of the same race, not created by human laws, some of which can never be
eradicated. These differences created different social relations, recognized by all
well organized governments. If we cast aside Chimercial [sic] theories and look
to practical results, it seems to us it must be conceded that separate schools for
colored children is a regulation to their great advantage. It is true, Brummell's
children must go 3- miles to reach a colored school, while no white child in the
district is required to go further than 2 miles. The distance which these children
must go to reach a colored school is a matter of inconvenience which must arise
in any school system. The law does not undertake to establish a school within a
given distance of any one, white or black. The inequality in distances to be trav-
elled by the children of different families is but an incident to any classification
and furnishes no substantial ground of complaint.
Brief for Defendant in Error (Miller) at 18 (emphasis in original).
202. The briefs argued the case, at least in substantial part, in terms of the model of
unjustifiable classifications. See Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 12-14; Brief for Defendant in
Error (Miller) at 19; Brief for Defendant in Error (School Board) at 14.
203. See text accompanying notes 173-78 and note 176 supra.
204. See, e.g., C. HImNEs, supra note 46. B. Twiss, supra note 46; Corwin, The Supreme
Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L. Rav. 643, 650 (1909); Hamilton, supra
note 28.
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each case it declined the opportunity to define the prohibition and
thereby restrict its own power. Instead it followed a policy which
failed to give notice to the legislatures-arguably, the principal ad-
dressees of the fourteenth amendment 2 5-of the kind of activity
which would be deemed impermissible. Even the conservative eco-
nomic philosophy which evoked so much of the Court's work was
never applied consistently. The fourteenth amendment cast a
shadow over state regulatory legislation, but the dimensions of that
shadow were a matter of perpetual doubt.
It is important to recognize that these results were not the
consequence of misapplication of the model of unjustifiable classi-
fications. That model was necessarily incomplete as a method of
decision, omitting any strict criteria for distinguishing proper and
improper measures under the police power. Rather than defining
such standards, the Court proceeded only with such catchwords as
"reasonable" and "arbitrary," the meanings of which were uncer-
tain. Thus, laws segregating, isolating, and limiting the education
of blacks could be seen as perfectly reasonable, while those impos-
ing special burdens and restrictions on large business enterprises
could be viewed as oppressive and tyrannical.20 6
The model of unjustifiable classifications permitted such re-
sults. It by no means required them. A different* emphasis applied
to the same model could lead to results of extreme deference to
legislative judgments. In different hands, the same model might
produce only the mildest of restraints on legislative discretion. In-
deed, the end of the period under study appears to be the high
point of an era of judicial activity invalidating state regulatory
legislation.0 7
It is something of an irony that this era of American law is
205. See Linde, Judges, Critics and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 252-55
(1972).
206. See H. GRAHAM, supra note 109, at 11-13; G. WHrrE, THE AMERICAN JuD=LcL TRA-
DMON 86 (1976).
207. See note 136 & accompanying text supra. This period would be followed by a time
of increasing restraint in judicial review. The Connolly decision was delivered on March 10,
1902. On December 8, 1902 the Justice who was to be the principal influence in establishing
such judicial restraint, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., took his seat on the Supreme Court
bench. Some examples of the way the model of unjustifiable classifications was used by
Holmes as an instrument of judicial deference may be found in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200
(1927); Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 (1912); Missouri, Kan. & Tex.
Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267 (1904).
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commonly regarded as one of high formalism. 0 8 Some commenta-
tors have argued that stability replaced flexibility in the legal sys-
tem just as the drastic economic changes of the first half of the
nineteenth century were coming to an end. The formalist emphasis
in American law is thus regarded as locking into place the newly
accomplished redistribution of power and wealth.0 9 While there
are probably many versions of "formalism," the highly elastic kind
of adjudication which has been described here is not likely to fit
into most of them. This was not a period in which the Court forced
dissimilar factual controversies into unyielding doctrinal catego-
ries. In fact, quite the reverse was true. The law was bent to every
shade and nuance of fact which struck the judges as significant.210
208. See G. GiMoRE, THE AGES OF AmmcAN LAW 60-66 (1977); M. HORWITZ, Tha
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, 255-66; Belz, The Constitution and the
Gilded Age, in ESSAYS IN NDwrrn CENTURY AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 110 (Hall ed.
1971); Nelson, The Impact of the Anti Slavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reason-
ing in Nineteenth Century America, 87 H nv. L. REV. 513, 514-15 (1974).
No clear definition of formalism has emerged from legal scholarship. Professor Nelson
has succinctly stated a central characteristic when he notes its concern with "the preserva-
tion of the logical structure of the rules and fundamental principles of the law." Nelson,
supra, at 515. This is usually contrasted with "activism" or "instrumentalism" which is
more sensitive to the policy results of adjudication. See id.; K. 'LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION: DEcmmG APPEALS 38 (1960); Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
351, 354 (1973). But this does not exclude use of the term to describe other qualities of
adjudication and opinion making. Indeed, Nelson, later in the article cited, seems to identify
formalism not with a concern for rules, procedures, and sources of legitimacy over results
but with judicial invocation of large abstract moral notions as authority in contrast with
more particular economic and political justifications. Thus he sees the anti-slavery litigators
of the ante-belium period as arguing in the formalist style while the judges who turned
down their idealistic claims were more hard-headed instrumentalists. Compare Nelson,
supra, at 53845 with R. CovER, JusTcE AccusED (1975). Nelson sees this human rights
rhetoric as triumphant in the constitutional law of this period-hence its denomination as
formalist. Of course, the use of grand moralistic and unspecific language is quite consistent
with the kind of free-wheeling, unpredictable and undisciplined adjudication under the
fourteenth amendment discussed in text.
209. See G. GILMORE, supra note 208, at 66; M. HoRwrrz, supra note 208, at 253-54.
210. "Justice Peckham's opinion [in Lochner v. New York] that there were no reasona-
ble grounds for interfering with the right of free contract by determining the hours of labour
in the occupation of a baker may indeed be a wrongheaded piece of conservatism but there
is nothing automatic or mechanical about it." Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law
and Morals, 71 HA!v. L. Rnv. 593, 611 n.39 (1958).
It is possible to understand this period in Supreme Court history, however, as both
nonformalist and protective of the newly established economic interests. Those interests
were primarily served through crystallization of private law doctrine-principally a product
of common law adjudication. But the gravest threat to the stability of such doctrine arose
from the social and economic experimentation of the legislatures. Effective judicial control
of that legislation required a free-wheeling Court and an adaptable arsenal of constitutional
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Of course, this development was directly at odds with the idea
of constitutional law as setting enforceable boundaries for proper
governmental action. Instead of a limited government we had an
unpredictable judicial veto. The limits of governmental power were
unknown except on a day-to-day or year-to-year basis. This was no
less inconsistent with the concept of constitutional limits because
it was the judiciary and not the legislature that was in charge of
the ongoing redefinition. But, given our unreviewable institution of
judicial review and the apparent implicit invitations of the "majes-
tic generalities" 211 of the Constitution, the temptation to assume
that power may have been irresistible. It would have taken a Court
of extraordinary fortitude in self-abnegation to choose the model
of impermissible classifications over the model of unjustifiable clas-
sifications. Few Justices in history have demonstrated a willingness
to choose such a course and fewer still an ability to follow it.
weapons. Such an effort would be ill served by a priori, limited, knowable, and therefore
inflexible constitutional doctrine. We might then find a tendency toward formalism in pri-
vate law and activism in constitutional law as complementary developments, limiting the
judicial reach with respect to private centers of power while expanding it with respect to the
legislatures.
211. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649 (1966).
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